Public Islam on the Balkans in a wider Europe context by Evstatiev, Simeon
 Public Islam on the Balkans in a 
Wider Europe Context
SIMEON EVSTATIEV
C P S   I N T E R N A T I O N A L   P O L I C Y   F E L L O W S H I P   P R O G R A M
2
0
0
5
/
2
0
0
6

CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
SIMEON EVSTATIEV 
 
Public Islam on the Balkans in a wider  
Europe context 
 
This policy paper was produced under the 2005-06 International Policy 
Fellowship program. Simeon Evstatiev was a member of the `Wider Europe` 
working group, which was directed by Michael Emerson. More details of their 
policy research can be found at http://www.policy.hu/themes05/weurope/ 
index.html . 
 
The views contained inside remain solely those of the author who may be 
contacted at evstatiev@policy.hu. For a fuller account of this policy research 
project, please visit http://www.policy.hu/evstatiev/ 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2006 
 
 
Language Editing – Martin Baker 
Formatting and Type setting – Tamas Sellei 
 
 
 
International Policy Fellowship Program 
Open Society Institute 
Nador Utca 9 
Budpest 1051 
Hungary 
 
www.policy.hu 
 
 
 
 
This document is available under a Creative Commons distribution copyright 
Contents 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................. 5 
1.1 Islamic Resurgence as a Challenge to Wider Europe……………………………………..5 
1.2 The Re-Islamization of the Balkan Muslims in a Wider Europe Context………….........10 
2. Public Islam in the Western Balkans………………………………………….17 
2.1 Historical and demographic characteristics .................................................................. 17 
2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Antagonistic Tolerance ............................................ 22 
2.3 Sandzak: a new religious dynamic of the territory of Serbia......................................... 31 
2.4 Kosovo: between secular nationalism and return of religion ........................................ 33 
2.5 Islam in the Republic of Macedonia: new challenges ................................................... 36 
3. Islam and Public Policy in Bulgaria ........................................................... 40 
3.1 Islam in Wider Europe Context: Towards Bridging the Divides from the 
Balkans with Bulgaria as an EU member............................................................................ 41 
3.2 Islam and the Modern Bulgarian State.......................................................................... 42 
3.3 Demographic and Ethno-Religious Aspects ................................................................. 45 
3.3.1 Ethnic Turks ........................................................................................................... 49 
3.3.2 Pomaks .................................................................................................................. 49 
3.3.3 Roma Muslims ....................................................................................................... 51 
3.4 Islam in everyday life and the public sphere in Bulgaria............................................... 52 
3.5 New Tendencies among Muslims in Bulgaria ............................................................... 56 
3.6 Islamic Religious Education in Bulgaria ........................................................................ 57 
3.7 The foreign Islamic influence in Bulgaria ...................................................................... 60 
3.8 Splitting among Religious Leaders of Muslims in Bulgaria ........................................... 62 
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations .............................................. 63 
5. General Conclusion .................................................................................. 66 
6. Bibliography .............................................................................................. 66 
SIMEON EVSTATIEV: PUBLIC ISLAM ON THE BALKANS 
 5 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Islamic Resurgence as a Challenge to Wider Europe 
Religion comprises a main source of identity, value orientations and worldview 
concepts on the large scale level. Secularized Europe is not and cannot be 
perceived as a rule – it is an apparent exception in the modern world, as well 
as the post-modern one. Industrialization and modernization in different 
regions of the world – the USA, the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia 
and Japan – did not lead to accomplishing the dream of liberalism, which saw 
religion as “hiding” in the private sphere. The very basis of that “wall of 
separation” between religion and politics the building of which was advised by 
Thomas Jefferson, seem shaken down. Nowadays religion plays again an 
important role in social life; while on that basis new public spheres emerge, 
including the means of modern communication technologies. In that sense, 
Peter Burger is completely right by emphasizing that “those who neglect 
religion in their analyses of the present situation are running a serious risk at 
the same time”.1 Many of the intellectual and political movements of modernity 
actually ran that risk but our modernity turned to be in no way “dispelled”. The 
case of Islam is in fact different, because there secularization was not 
accomplished in the sense of this term given by Peter Burger.   
The “revival” or “awakening” (sahwa) of Islam in public and social life 
during the last decades is a various and multi-faceted process. It started as 
characterized by an extraordinary dynamics in the 70’s of the 20th century in 
the form of a “return” of Islam as a powerful factor in the policy of Middle 
Eastern societies.  In the Islamic world exists an established consensus 
opinion that the roots of such an “awakening” should be looked for in the 
humiliating defeat of Arabs in the June War in 1967 with Israel.2 A strong 
impetus to that process was given by the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) but 
                                            
1 Burger, Peter, Desecularization of the World: a Global Overview, Sofia, 2004, p. 33. 
2 Hanafi, Hasan. „Ahadith fi-l-harakat ad-diniyya al-mu‘asira” [Discussions on Modern religious 
Movements], Ad-din wa d-dawla fi-Misr [Religion and State in Egypt], vol. VІ: Al-wusuliya al-
islamiyya [Islamic Fundamentalism], Cairo, 1989, p. 320. 
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it soon spread over the largest part of the Muslim world or a least over the 
countries from Sudan to Indonesia. The revival of Islam passes under the sign 
of the tendency to ground political legitimacy in Islamic religion. This was done 
by the ruling regimes and statesmen, as well as by many of the opposing 
groups and leaders. The characteristics of this process always depend on the 
definite political, culturally-historical and economical context.    
The dynamic return of Islam in public and political life did not spread over 
the Muslims of the Middle East only, but also over their co-fellows in the faith 
in Europe and America. The Balkans are not excluded out of this process 
either. In the European Union countries where nowadays live between 15 and 
20 million Muslims3, talks about a “post migrational religious minority” carrying 
out a “silent revolution”, have already started. This minority shapes the 
outlines of a phenomenon called “Islamization of European political cultures”4 
which comprises a part of the complex changes in post-modern religiosity of 
Muslims and Christians alike. In the 60’s and 70’s of the twentieth century, 
significant differences in the emigration motives to America and the Western 
Europe were observed. People traveled beyond the Ocean in order to settle 
permanently there, while those who went to the Old Continent did that in order 
to earn some money, after that returning to their places of origin. Since the 
90’s of the past century, however, a permanent “Americanization” of the 
emigration to Europe occurred. As a result of that, according to some 
prognoses – though exaggerated to some extent – the number of Muslims in 
Europe in 2050 is supposed to exceed that of non-Muslims5. Having this 
background information, it is natural that the Islamophobic analysis  and 
pessimistic prognoses about the future are often based on the demographic 
factor in defense  of the thesis that Islam is “taking over” Europe.   
A typical example in that aspect is the activity of some journalists and 
public writers such as the Italian Orianna Falaci who stated that Europe is 
becoming more and more a province of Islam, a colony of Islam”. This rebirth 
                                            
3 The statistical data is based on different estimations and it is very difficult to cite exact 
figures about the number of Muslims in Europe.  
4 Cesari, Jocelyne, “Muslim Minorities in Europe: The Silent Revolution”, John L. Esposito and 
François Burgat (eds.) Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the 
Middle East, Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick / New Jersey, 2003, pp. 256, 265. 
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of the old image of the “Islamic threat” after September 11th 2001 is being 
supplemented by the analysis of experts on Middle East issues, for example 
the American Daniel Pipes; in his view, the national European cultures, such 
as the Italian, French and English ones, are doomed to be assimilated and 
melted down in a sort of a “transnational Muslim identity” which will be a 
“mixture of North-African, Turkish and sub-continental elements” 6.  
These exaggerated and ideologically tinted prognoses contain also a hint 
of a really existing tendency, namely the merging of boundaries between 
‘Islam” and “Europe” which has been more evident in recent years.  This, 
however, is not only a result of emigration. Olivier Roy quite soundly 
distinguished the more general new phenomenon of deterritorialization.   
According to him, Islam is less and less bound to a definite territory and 
civilization area, while “the frontier between Islam and the West is no longer 
geographical, and is less and less civilisational” 7 . In this sense 
deterrritorialization of Islam is also related to globalization and has nothing to 
do with Islam as religion which makes the thesis of the “clash of civilizations” 
less feasible.  
This emerging change of proportions and shifting of whole historical and 
demographical layers enforce a reconsideration of the attitude towards Islam 
which defines the life of the majority of population in the Middle East,8 as well 
the life of a vast bulk of the population of the Old Continent and the New 
World. Questions regarding the political participation of Muslims in societies 
with democratic social structure according to the Western pattern are raised. 
New religious authority statements-fatwas have been issued in order to 
regulate the life of Muslims as a minority. New Muslim organizations emerge. 
Some of them dedicate their activity to religious preaching while others (such 
                                                                                                                             
5 Cheribi, Oussama. “The Growing Islamization of Europe”, Modernizing Islam: Religion in the 
Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East, New Brunswick / New Jersey, 2003, p. 195. 
6 Pipes, Daniel. “Muslim Europe”, New York Sun, May 14, 2004. The article is available in the 
Internet at: <http://www.danielpipes.org/article/1796>. 
7 Roy. Olivier. Globalized Islam: The Search for a new Ummah, Columbia University Press: 
New York, 2004, p. 18. 
8 It its broader sense used recently, the Middle East includes the territories from Rabat to 
Teheran spreading over countries on three continents – North Africa, South-Eastern Asia and 
the European part of Turkey.   
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as the Muslim Youth Union in France) combine Islamic communalist claims 
with the civility rhetoric9.   
It is obvious now that – no matter how much it has been discussed until 
now – the issue of the relation between religion and politics in the Muslim 
world again comes forth, this time connected to Muslim communities in 
Europe and America as well.  In Europe this relation becomes more and more 
pressing while the present encounter between “Islam” and the European 
identity in the process of formation is often looked upon as being problematic. 
What are the reasons for this existing ambivalent attitude towards Islam and 
Muslims in the Old Continent? 
Among all world religions nowadays Islam seems to be the most active 
one, putting forth its universalist claims in the global public sphere in the most 
dynamic way; at the same time, this does not mean that there are not similar 
processes of revival running  in Christian and other religious communities in 
the world. Nowadays a new “social communication infrastructure”10 emerges 
on the national and transnational levels, which establishes new conditions of 
publicity. Modern English speaking academic studies of the processes related 
to public role of Islam, employ “nuanced” (as Charles Taylor would say) terms 
such as “societal Islam” and “public Islam”. In this study of mine the term 
“public Islam” has been used as an academic convention in the sense defined 
by Dale Eickelman and Armando Salvatore:  
“Public Islam” refers to the highly diverse invocations of Islam as ideas 
and practices that religious scholars, self-ascribed religious authorities, 
secular intellectuals, Sufi orders, mothers, students, workers, engineers, 
and many others make to civic debate and public life. In this “public” 
capacity, “Islam” makes a difference in configuring the politics and social 
life of large parts of the globe, and not just for self-ascribed religious 
authorities. It makes this difference not only as a template for ideas and 
practices but also as a way of envisioning alternative political realities 
and, increasingly, in acting on both local and global stages, thus 
reconfiguring established boundaries of civil and social life.11 
                                            
9 Kepel, Gilles. Allah in the West: Islamic Movements in America and Europe, Polity Press: 
Cambridge, 1997, p. 227. 
10 Dale F. Eickelman and Jon W. Anderson (Eds.). New Media in the Muslim World: The 
Emerging Public Sphere. 2nd Edition, Indiana University Press: Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
2003, p. X. 
11 Salvatore, A. and D. Eickelman, “Pubic Islam and the Common Good”, Preface to Public 
Islam and the Common Good, Edited by A. Salvatore and D. Eickelman, Brill: Leiden, Boston, 
2004, p. xii. 
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The new Islamic public sphere that has emerged in the last years is 
connected with the development of mass education and new communication 
technologies whereas new media and Internet play an extraordinary 
significant role by unleashing new processes and deepening old tendencies. 
Probably the most important one among them is the fragmentation of the 
public sphere and the religious authority in the Muslim world.  As a whole, 
however, in Islamic public sphere nowadays – on the national, as well as the 
transnational level12 – the ideals that do not allow religion to stay in the sphere 
of the private life of the individual according to the Western democratic model, 
are still alive.   
In the modern time this has been changed under the pressure of internal 
and external factors to the Middle East – the role of the traditional ulamas has 
decreased significantly which led to a fragmentation of religious authority, 
unknown to the history of Islam to-date13. It has been running since the 19th 
century on and has a key role for the understanding also of contemporary 
events and processes in Muslim communities. In Iran after the ill successes of 
the Islamic revolution, in the Arab world and other Sunni states this represents 
a clear-cut crisis of the spiritual authority, as well a crisis of the traditional 
centers of Islamic religious education. We have to emphasize that this is a 
tendency existing not only in Islam.  The general crisis of the Catholic 
priesthood is also an evident truth, as it is running alongside with the 
emergence of the idea of the charisma to the foreground. The influence of the 
large number of charismatic leaders contributes to circumventing the 
established religious institutions and academic authorities on the basis of the 
principle “anyone could speak about the truth because one achieves it by 
means of experience”. The emotional ties with religion substitute the 
intellectual and scientific approach and this is a common feature of 
Christianity and Islam nowadays when the “success of conservative values is 
not the success of religious institutions”.14 
                                            
12 Cf. Eickelman, Dale F. and Armando Salvatore. “Muslim Publics”, In: D. Eickelman and A. 
Salvatore. Public Islam and the Common Good. Brill: Leiden, Boston, 2004, p. 10. 
13 Cf. Bulliet, Richard W. The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization, 2004, pp. 135-136. 
14 Roy. Olivier. Globalized Islam: The Search for a new Ummah, New York, 2004, p. 34-35. 
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1.2 The Re-Islamization of the Balkan Muslims in a Wider Europe 
Context 
The re-emergence of Islam in the public sphere is a plural and varied process, 
and re-Islamization is a diverse and complex process which occurs not only in 
countries and regions with Muslim majorities as those in the Middle East but 
also among the large Muslim minorities in Europe and America. Olivier Roy 
defines re-Islamization as “a process of deculturation (that is a crisis of 
pristine cultures giving way to westernization and reconstructed identities”15 
emphasizing that “the role of Islam in shaping contemporary societies has 
been overemphasized” 16 . Is there a “return of the religious” among the 
Muslims in the Balkans and at which extend are they involved in the process 
of re-Islamization?                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Muslims in the Balkans, like Muslims worldwide, are turning Islam into a 
significant public and political force. Yet “religion is obviously central to the 
political life of peoples around the world, not simply to Muslims”;17 however, 
the notion of an “Islamic threat” coming mainly from Middle Eastern political 
regimes and movements has been created in the West. Observers speak of 
the alleged incompatibility of Islam and democracy, of the fanaticism of 
“Islamic fundamentalists” and of the strong opposition to the secularization 
and modernization of Middle Eastern societies that have completely different 
cultural values than those of the West. Furthermore, many still maintain that 
there is a single monolithic political doctrine of Islam and that this doctrine is 
incompatible with pluralist democracy, an idea that first developed in the 
West.18 
Islamic actors with an agenda in the public sphere challenge the 
domestic politics of various EU countries as well as the political life in many of 
the EU ‘candidates’ and ‘neighbours’. Both the Muslim majority world and the 
Muslim minorities in Europe outside the EU are perceived as one of the major 
challenges for the Wider Europe Initiative and the new European 
                                            
15 Ibid, p. 22. 
16 Ibid, p. 14. 
17 Eickelman, Dale F. and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press 1996, p. 56. 
18 See Krämer, Gudrun. “Islamist Notions of Democracy.” Political Islam, edited by J. Benin 
and Joe Stork. Pp. 71-82. Berkley, Los Angeles University of California Press, 1997, p.71. 
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Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)19 which seeks to share the benefits of the EU’s 
enlargement with the neighboring Eastern and Southern countries. 20  For 
these Muslim minority communities the long-standing cultural links with the 
Arab world or with Turkey are getting more and more important in the period 
after the Cold War.  
Balkan countries are pursuing their relations with the EU in several 
different frameworks. Bulgaria and Romania are well advanced and aim to join 
the Union in January 2007. Turkey is a country with a different timetable 
remaining for now between ‘candidate’ and ‘neighbour’. Except for Croatia, 
which is already a candidate country, the other Western Balkan countries – 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
and Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo, are defined by the EU as 
‘potential candidate countries’. 21  These potential future EU members are 
developing their relations with the Union supported by the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP). Yet, the ENP does not cover any Balkan country, 
however, Bulgaria and Romania will be involved in its implementation after 
they become EU members.  
There are a variety of perspectives to the EU in South-East Europe where 
the population is ethnically and religiously mixed, for apart from the Christians 
there are significant Muslim communities. For all of these Muslim communities 
the long-standing cultural links with the Muslim majority, particularly with 
Turkey and the Arab world, world are getting more and more important in the 
post-communist period. Bulgaria is the only EU acceding Balkan country with 
a substantial Muslim minority (more than 12%). Since the change of the 
regime in 1989, Bulgaria’s policy towards the Muslim-majority world, and 
sometimes even to the local Muslim community, has been erratic and virtually 
non-existent on a conceptual level. Islam is underestimated and misused as a 
factor in the design of the public policy. Public interest has been mainly 
sensation-based, and the vague attempts for public discussions. 
                                            
19 http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/index_en.htm  
20 See Michael Emerson. “The Wider Europe Matrix”, Centre for European Policy Studies, 
Brussels, January, 2004. 
21 http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/candidate.htm  
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The basic argument of this paper is that policy analysis and policy design 
should not simply rely on the modernist strategy that saw religion as a 
problem. This “classical” approach was to avoid religion’s conflictual terrain by 
setting it outside the public sphere. Yet, the undoubted quest for cultural 
authenticity within Islam today requires an adequate response, including 
within the ENP. The future success of the European project depends in a 
considerable degree on the re-conceptualization of the cultural factors in the 
design of a new neighbourhood policy, particularly as far as Islamic factor is 
concerned. Given the strong relationship between religious identity and 
political and social peace in the Balkans, the argument here is that it is 
extremely important to study the impact of the Islamic and Islamist 
movements and discourses on the Balkan Muslim communities. There is an 
urgent need to search for new strategies, continually re-thinking the role of 
Islam and its potential to collaborate in addressing the more trenchant 
problems of domestic and international affairs. 
The discussion paper aims to contribute to these debates by suggesting 
directions for inter-disciplinary research on Islam and Muslim identity in the 
public sphere, particularly in the Balkans but also in the Middle East and 
within the EU’s  
'neighbourhood' project. Attention should be given to the capacity of Muslim 
publics to overcome the broader cultural divide between “Islam” and the 
“West”, in this regard exploring the Bulgarian, and more generally the Balkan, 
model for interethnic and interfaith coexistence in the ENP context can make 
an important contribution. Thirdly, how can Islam play a role in the design and 
the implementation of the ENP in the Balkans, and particularly with Bulgaria 
as an EU member? 
The general question is how Muslim values practices can fit into the 
European project? Can desecularization proceed without a reversal of 
modernization and the creation of identity conflicts which in turn may spawn 
extremist attitudes? It seems hardly possible to study the interactions between 
European institutions and Muslim countries adjacent to Europe without taking 
into account cultural differences. For various reasons, the cleavage between 
Christianity and Islam does coincide with comprehensive differences in ways 
of life. For example, a key concept to understand current issues involving 
SIMEON EVSTATIEV: PUBLIC ISLAM ON THE BALKANS 
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Islam is the idea of the public sphere. In Western Europe, this is an idea 
closely associate with the German social theorist, Jürgen Habermas and his 
idea of the “rationality potential” of communicative action.  
Habermas follows Immanuel Kant in characterizing the public sphere as 
“ideally an intermediate space in which ideas are presented in their own 
merits by self-reflective moral subjects rather than as emanating from 
authorities such as preachers, judges and rulers. Even for early modern 
Europe, however, the early Habermas neglected the role of religion in the 
development and expansion of the public sphere.”22 Given the salience of 
religious identity in the preservation and promotion of political and social 
peace in Bulgaria and Eastern Europe information about religion needs to be 
conveyed across groups so as to maximize mutual understanding and 
minimize stereotyping.  
A second key concept for overcoming existing intercultural gap between 
Islam and secular European societies is the idea of religion and religiosity. 
During the fourteen centuries of their mutual history the civilizations of 
Christianity and Islam created complicated political, economic and intercultural 
relations. From these two world religions sprung societies which have, on 
occasion, faced encounters which evolved into military conflicts under the 
banners of “Crusades” or “Jihad”. Byzantine sources mentioned the first 
encounter with the Muslims as a border battle with followers of a “false 
prophet”. From a theological perspective, the first evaluation of Islam was 
similar. In his “Book of Heresies” St. John of Damascus described Islam as a 
newly emerged “heresy” of the Arian type denying Jesus Christ’s 
consubstantiality with God.  
On the doctrinal level Muslims also demonstrated a lack of interest in 
Christians. The Qur’an had categorized Christians as “people of the Book” 
(ahl al-kitāb) with whom, generally, good relations should be maintained. 
However, Christians were seen as having adulterated the Gospel with many 
mistakes and misinterpretations. These mutual perceptions characterized the 
relations between Christianity and Islam during the middle ages, although the 
                                            
22 Eickelman, Dale F. and Armando Salvatore, “Muslim Publics”, Public Islam and the 
Common Good, Eds. D. Eickelman and A. Salvatore, Brill: Leiden, Boston. 2004. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIP 2005/06 
 14 
actual features of “the true face” of each of the two religions remained hidden 
to “the Other”. The Christian and Muslim worlds entered the Modern Era 
burdened with mutual prejudice. The West saw the political and economic 
backwardness of the “realm of Islam” (dār al-islām), and in particular, the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire, as an occasion for its colonial “civilizing 
mission”. In turn, the religious, social and cultural elite of the Muslim world 
responded with actions that had far-reaching effects. In the nineteenth century, 
prominent Muslim thinkers sought to adapt the interpretation of Islam to 
modern reality, beginning a reform process that continues to date.  Reform 
has comprised a dynamic combination of modernization and a revival of faith 
and return to its basic texts: the Qur’an (the Word of God for Muslims) and the 
Prophetic Sunna (the Holy Tradition of Islam comprising the sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad).  It this process, one sees almost all reformers (aside 
from the secularized modernists) continuing to draw on basic texts and 
teachings. This can to a certain degree be compared to the Christian tradition 
and Martin Luther and his call for a return to the foundation of the Gospel and 
a purification of the historical aberrations and misapprehensions within the 
Catholic Church. 
Despite the history of misreading, there was a gradual rectification of 
Christianity’s “medieval misunderstandings” of Islam and Muslims. This was 
due not only because of social and political developments during the colonial 
and decolonial ages, it was also a consequence of developments in the 
humanities, especially in Arabic and Islamic Studies. Introduced in some 
European universities as early as in the 16th and 17th centuries 23  this 
academic project was very often closely linked to the imperial. 24  Some 
orientalists, like Louis Massignon and his follower Henri Corbin, even 
gradually came to be convinced that Islam, like Christianity, was a great 
religion of Revelation with a deep mystic spirit, underlying one of the most 
significant civilizations. Other orientalists such as Hamilton Gibb eagerly 
defended the merits of Islamic orthodoxy. Although Edward Said criticized 
                                            
23  Collège de France 1587, Leiden 1613, Cambridge 1632, and Oxford 1634. 
24 Jorgen S. Nielsen, “Orientalism and Anti-Orientalism: Is There a Middle Way?”, Ethnology 
of Sufi Orders: Theory and Practice, Proceedings of the British-Bulgarian Workshop on Sufi 
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both types for “essentialising Islam”25 they gradually convinced some in the 
West that, with respect to spirituality, Islam was also a path to religious 
salvation. In the eyes of Christians, Muslims’ search for religious truth became 
increasingly legitimate, and in consequence, so did their religious identity.  In 
other words, the conclusions of scholars were not confined to universities but 
brought about a slow but persistent change in the attitude of Western 
Christianity towards Islam. 
This change in official dialogue acted as the catalyst for a series of 
initiatives, meetings and resolutions. One such was the 1990 encyclical 
Redemptoris Missio which invited Muslims to meetings dealing with various 
concerns, including “Meaning and Levels of Revelation”, “The Concept of 
Monotheism in Islam and Christianity” and “Common Humanitarian Ideals for 
Muslims and Christians”. Thus Western Christianity gradually managed to 
push to the fore not merely toleration of Islam, but also real consideration and 
respect for “the Other” – his religious identity and tradition. 
Can such historical examples be applied in the current realities with regard 
to the recent debates and challenges involving Islam? Is the European notion 
of secularism still relevant to contemporary realities, including the 
demographic ones? Is the modernization of Muslims possible only by 
emancipation from Islam or there is a way to achieve modernization without to 
abandon religion? We can examine some of these issues in respect of the 
Western Balkans, the region with the largest native Muslim populations in 
Europe.  
The greater part of the Balkans fell under Ottoman rule before the end of 
the 14th century. What is the outcome of the long coexistence between 
Christians and Muslims in South-Eastern Europe? Is there any sort of 
tolerance peculiar to the Balkans and if the answer is “yes”, is it a positive 
acknowledgement and recognition of differences carried by the “Other”, or 
there is rather a pragmatic compliance to one another, a peculiar “antagonistic 
                                                                                                                             
Orders 19-23 May 2000, Sofia, Ed. Antonina Zhelyazkova and J. Nielsen, International Center 
for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia 2001, p. 339. 
25 Said, Edward, Orientalism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 265. 
CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES/INTERNATIONAL POLICY FELLOWSHIP 2005/06 
 16 
tolerance”, if we have to use this successful term of Robert Hayden26.  In this 
case we are interested in two main problems. The first one is what type of 
“public Islam” has been developed on the Balkans, and then, does it impose a 
model or different “Balkan” models which could contribute to understanding 
and coexistence with Muslims in the framework of modern Europe? And  
second,   what sorts of new European strategies and policies complying with 
the terms of contemporary realities should be developed  by the EU or in other 
cases by the particular Balkan states in order to curb that conflict potential 
which stems (be it right or not) from the political and cultural problems related 
to Islam?  
                                            
26 Hayden, Robert M. “Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in 
South Asia and the Balkans”, Current Anthropology, Volume 43, Number 2, April 2002. 
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2. Public Islam in the Western Balkans 
2.1 Historical and demographic characteristics 
The Balkan Peninsula was conquered by the Ottomans at the end of the 14th 
century. Meanwhile, a parallel process of spreading Islam in these Christian 
territories took place.  Ottoman studies are dominated by the view that 
although the Ottoman Empire adhered to the doctrine of the “holy war” (jihad), 
the main purpose of the conquests was not the extermination of subjugated 
indigenous population but rather ruling over the new subjects according to the 
doctrines of Islam. That is why whenever a certain town or region surrendered 
without resisting the advancing Ottoman army, its inhabitants were allowed to 
retain their faith; otherwise, the subjugated population was enslaved or 
killed.27 
As a whole, academic literature offers three different theories on the way 
of spreading Islam on the Balkans. According to the first one in historical 
science, immediately after the Ottoman conquests a genocide over the 
indigenous population started; then it was followed by mass settlement of 
Anatolian Turks in these lands.28 The second theory about the compulsive 
enforcement of Islam is supported by some nationalistically minded historians 
who emphasize before all upon the coercive recruitment of Christian boys 
(devshirme) and their military training in order to participate in Ottoman  
Janissary Corps (14th–18th centuries). 29  According to the third theory, 
supported by the majority of Western scholars, conversion to Islam was 
carried on a voluntary basis, in most of the cases due to economic reasons, 
because by accepting the new religion the non-Muslim subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire avoided a number of taxes and enjoyed considerable 
                                            
27 Jelavic, Barbara. History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Volume 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, р. 39. 
28 Zhelyazkova, Antonina. “Formirane na myusyulmanskite obshnosti i kompleksite na 
balkanskite istoriografii” [“The Formation of the Muslim Communities and the Balkan 
Historiographies”], Myusyulmanskite obshtnosti na Balkanite i v Bulgariya. Istoricheski eskizi. 
[Muslim Communities in the Balkans and in Bulgaria. Historical Excerpts], International Centre 
for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Foundation, Sofia, 1997, р. 14.        
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privileges.30 At present Southeastern Europe is inhabited by about 8 million of 
Muslims which comprises about one-third of all the Muslims in Europe. 
Contrary to immigrant Muslim communities in Western Europe, Muslims in the 
Balkans represent a part of the indigenous population. They belong to four 
main ethno-linguistic groups – the Slavonic speaking ones, ethnical Turks, 
Albanians and Roma. Their status in each different country is distinguished by 
its different cultural, historical, social and economical context in which their 
communities developed. In Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina   
Muslims constitute a majority, while in all other Balkan countries they are a 
minority. Some regions, such as Sandzak, which is situated between the inner 
borders of Serbia and Montenegro, are inhabited by a compact Muslim 
community, comprising a local majority. As a result of the historical 
development since the age of the Ottoman Empire, the type of Islam which is 
the most common one in the Balkans, is the Sunni Islam belonging to the 
Hanafi madhab (a religious-juridical school), defined as the most tolerant and 
flexible one when interpreting the Islamic religious Law (the shari‘a). In some 
of the Balkan regions there are Shia-Alevis, as well Sufi (mystical) orders and 
brotherhoods, among whom a special role is played by the Bektashi.  
During the period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the religious organization 
of the Muslims was initially divide into three regions. The Muslims of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia were under the leadership of reis-ul-
ulama (“the Grand Ulem”, the analogue of the “Grand Mufti” in Sarajevo), 
while Serbian and Macedonian Muslims fell under the jurisdiction of the reis-
ul-ulama in Belgrade. The Mufti of Stari Bar, on the other hand, was the leader 
of the Muslims in Montenegro. In 1930, however, as a part of the 
centralization program of King Alexander, Muslim religious interests were 
united in the newly created Supreme Council of the Islamic Religious 
Community with its headquarters based in Belgrade.  Until the end of 1936 
two main seats were preserved, one of them being in Sarajevo, and the other 
one in Belgrade; after that both of them were united in a Sarajevo based 
                                                                                                                             
29 Mutafchieva, Vera. Turtsiya [Turkey], Open Society Publishing House), Sofia, 1998, р.10. 
30 Jelavic, Barbara. History of the Balkans. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Volume 1, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, р. 40. 
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organization.31 During the Communist period the doctrine of “Yugoslavism” 
based on the principle of “brotherhood and unity” was laid down in the federal 
Constitution. The citizens enjoyed equal rights and obligations with no regard 
of their ethnical and religious identity32 . The Muslims in Macedonia were 
looked upon as an integral part of Yugoslavian Muslim community and were 
headed by the reis-ul-ulama in Sarajevo. Practically, the Islamic Community 
(Islamska zajednica) in socialist Yugoslavia was divided into four 
administrative regions: Sarajevo, Prishtina, Skopje and Titograd.33  
According to scholars of the Balkans, there are at least two reasons for 
tolerating Islam in former Yugoslavia. The first one has a local, regional 
character and is related to the fact that the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was established as a modus vivendi of the three main groups of 
population in the territories that belong to it, namely Orthodox Serbs, Catholic 
Croatians and Muslim Slavs. Historically speaking, this territory has been 
inhabited by ethnically mixed population; this provides a ground of both Serbs 
and Croatians to claim over these lands and population. In the 1970’s the 
‘Muslim” nation was established as means of counteracting  both Serbian and 
Croatian claims over the Muslim Slavs on the territory of Yugoslavia34. The 
second reason is also related to the specific position of Yugoslavia “between 
East and West” during the Cold War. This made its statesmen seek a political 
space beyond the East-west confrontation pattern among the “non-aligned 
nations”, many of which were Muslim states.35 
It has to be made clear that Muslims in the socialist republic of Macedonia 
did not enjoy such a freedom to express their religious identity to the extent 
that Bosnian Muslims did.  Most probably, this was because with the 
establishment of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (which did not exist before 
the creation of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) and its 
                                            
31 Friedman, Francine. The Bosnian Muslims. Denial of a Nation. Westview Press: Colorado, 
1996, р. 107.  
32 Lampe, John R. Yugoslavia as a History. Twice There Was a Country. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1996, р. 232.  
33 Poulton, Hugh. The Balkans. States and Minorities in Conflict, Minority Rights Group 
Publications: London, 1993, р.41. 
34 Ibid, p. 39-41. 
35 Popovic, Alexandar. Posrednici i metafore. Jugoslovenski muslimani (1945-1989) 
[Intermediaries and Metaphors. Yugoslav Muslims (1945-1989)], Akvarius: Belgrade, 1990, 
pp. 20-21. 
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subsequent separation from the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1967, the 
Macedonian Orthodox population started enjoying special attitude on behalf of 
Yugoslavian authorities. The Orthodox faith was used to encourage the 
constitution of a Macedonian ethical and national identity and respectively, 
loyalty towards Yugoslavia. This was not applied, however, to Muslims during 
the regime of Tito.36 
After the death of Tito in 1980 and the collapse of Yugoslavian economy, 
the politicians of Yugoslavia started being “ethnicized” more and more. At the 
end of the 1980’s the regime of the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic 
changed the ethnical and religious balance in Serbia. The authorities directed 
their attention to the increasing Albanian nationalistic disaffection which 
started originating in the 1970’s. The Albanian claims over the independency 
of Kosovo were violently crushed during the time of the Prishtina commotions 
in 1981. In 1989 the Serbian Parliament even abolished the autonomous 
status of Kosovo and Voyvodina, which was guaranteed by the Constitution 
from 1974. During the 1970’s and 1980’s the Macedonian authorities 
undertook a series of initiatives to keep away the Muslim Macedonian 
community from “Albanization”. This fear originated from the growing Albanian 
nationalism in Kosovo and the fact that the Albanians in Macedonia 
constituted the most numerous Muslim minority which could exert pressure 
upon the less numerous Muslim minorities. In 1970 with the support of the 
official authorities an Association of Macedonian Muslims was established. 37 
In 1981 in Gostivar a special academic team was formed which conducted 
studies of Muslims in Macedonia. In Skopje the Isa Beg Madrasa was opened 
again. The Muslim newspaper “Al-Hilal” started being published in three 
languages, namely Macedonian, Albanian and Turkish.38 After the political 
changes in 1989 and the proclamation of the independency of Macedonia in 
                                            
36 Fraenkel, Eran. “Turning a Donkey into a Horse: Paradox and Conflict in the Identity of 
Makedontsi Muslimani”, In Balkan Forum. An International Journal of Politics and Culture, Vol. 
3 No. 4 (13), December 1995, 1995, pp. 153-163. 
37 Poulton, Hugh. “Changing Notions of National Identity among Muslims in Thrace and 
Macedonia: Turks, Pomaks and Roma,” In Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds., Muslim 
Identity and the Balkan State, Hurst & Company: London, 1997, р. 94. 
38 Popovic, Alexandar. Posrednici i metafore. Jugoslovenski muslimani (1945-1989) 
[Intermediaries and Metaphors. Yugoslav Muslims (1945-1989)], Akvarius: Belgrade, 1990), 
pp. 25-26. 
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1991, the Islamic community of Macedonia was separated form the 
administration of Sarajevo.   
The break up of Yugoslavia denoted the start of a new stage in the modern 
history of Islam and Muslim communities in the territories that belonged to it. 
The new processes and tendencies that have developed since the 1990’s on 
have their long-lasting influence upon the face of the “Balkan Islam”. The 
events in former Yugoslavia during the last 15 years and the wars in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia led to deepening the re-
Islamization tendency, as far the religion of Islam turned into a main factor of 
ethnical distinguishing and self-identification. Before the war Bosnia and the 
Balkans were generally perceived as a model of not only a religious tolerance 
but also of an educated, pluralistically minded “Euro-Islam”.  Islam, however, 
started being given a central role since the very beginning of the Bosnian 
conflict. Nowadays, after the subsidence of the armed conflicts, the issue of 
the imminent change in the image of Muslim communities on the Balkans 
concerning the global processes of re-Islamization and local tendencies of 
return to religion is also an important one.   
In the post-communist period since the beginning of the 1990’s century, 
the encroachment of non-typical for Southeastern Europe Islamic influences 
from the Middle East, the Arab world and particularly from Saudi Arabia 
started. In spite of the common religious basis, the cultural differences 
between the local Muslim population and the Muslim Arabs led to the rise of a 
series of misunderstandings and the establishment of a new kind of 
stereotypes related to the “Muslim threat”. In public space, under the influence 
of the global challenges related to Islam, started a noisy talk about the danger 
of the conservative Wahhabism – the puritan, official interpretation of Islam in 
Saudi Arabia.   A permanent public view was formed among non-Muslims on 
the Balkans: that Arab emissaries as well as local Muslims who fell under their 
influence, are bearers of a “foreign”, “fundamentalist” type of Islam.   
Scholars outline two main types of penetration of Wahhabism in the 
Balkans: either through Islamic humanitarian organizations and foundations or 
through local Balkan Muslims who receive their education in the Middle East 
and return to their countries of origin. As early as 2002 Natalie Claire, an 
expert at the French National Studies Council, noted that this “double import”, 
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i.e. through charity organizations and returning students, is one of the most 
interesting characteristics of the evolution of Balkan Islam in the last years 
and leads to its “deep transformation”. 39  This transformation, however, is 
manifested in different ways in the different states and regions of the Balkans. 
Southeastern Europe ahs always been a zone of turbulences which have 
often been results of conflicts, provoked by countries and forces external to 
the region. Nowadays a great part of the Muslims in the Balkan states 
perceive in this way re-Islamization which in fact comes as a result of two 
different processes of a purely modern nature, further aggravating the hidden 
conflict potential between Christians and Muslims. The first one is the origin of 
new identities, while the second one is related to globalization and 
transnational relations or “deterritorialization of Islam”. In this context, the 
pragmatic elite of the Balkan Muslims faces the challenge of how to preserve 
the appearance of the typically Balkan “tradition’ in these contemporary 
conditions. In the last years in Southeastern Europe the organized religious 
life of Muslims and Christians alike underwent a true revival. Just like various 
Christian denominations, more radical fundamentalist tendencies appeared 
within different Muslim communities. Though marginal from a sociological 
point of view their ideology and influence should not be underestimated.  
2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Antagonistic Tolerance  
Population – 4 499 000  
Ethnical groups 
14,3%
0,6%
37,1%
48%
Bosniaks
Serbs
Croatians
Others
 
                                            
39  Risto Karajkov, “The Young and the Old: Radical Islam Takes Roots in the Balkans”, May 
3, 2006, www.worldpress.org. 
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Religious groups  
 
15%
14%
31%
40%
Muslims
Orhodox Christian
Catholic
Others
 
In the last 15 years the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina went 
through a complex process related to the issue of reconsideration and 
reformulation of its ethnical and religious identity. The deep economic crisis 
that occurred after the break down of former Yugoslavia and the subsequent 
wars urged some of the representatives of Muslims in Bosnia and the other 
countries of the Western Balkans to seek establishing of close relations with 
countries of the Muslim world – Turkey, as well as more conservative regimes 
such as those in Saudi Arabia, the rest of the Gulf states and Iran. During the 
war the Bosnian Muslim government received a powerful support, including 
weapons, from Muslim states.  
Even before the war, although being an “apolitical” one, the Bosnian type 
of Islam represented the central source of formation the social and cultural 
identities of the so-called Bosniaks. Not all of the Bosnians, however, are 
Muslims; there are also Orthodox Christians among them, as well as Catholics. 
What is typical is that only the Muslims developed the identity of Bosniaks, 
while the rest of the population remained “Serbian” (Orthodox) or “Croatian” 
(Catholic). Before the war Bosnian Islam was an exemplum for the followers 
of this religion who lived in the secular democracies of Europe, which gave it 
its peculiar name of “Euro-Islam”. Even then such distinguished scholars as 
Smail Balic warned about the danger of replacing the “Bosnian” Islam with the 
“Oriental” type of Islam.40  
                                            
40 Tibi, Bassam. „Der bosnische Islam. Von säkularer Religion zum Fundamentalismus?“, In 
Internationale Politik, 7/1997. 
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In this aspect, the war in the country that last for four years brought about 
a negative development of the situation in Bosnia. Before that Bosniaks 
perceived themselves as “Muslims” (muslimani), taking into consideration their 
adherence to a specific cultural and religious community.  From the viewpoint 
of their political identity, however, they belonged to a secular public and legal 
community. The term nation in the language of the Bosnians which is an 
ethno-linguistic variety of the Serb-Croatian means an “ethno-religious group”. 
In this case this group includes mainly Bosniaks. Before the war Bosniaks had 
no particular relation with the Islamic world outside Europe and were not 
included in the Islamic umma, i.e. the universal political community to which – 
according to the Orthodox Islamic concept – every Muslim belongs, with no 
regard for his ethnical origin and locality.  
Similar to the rest of the countries inhabited by a Muslim minority, the 
Bosnian institutions face the serious problem of the character and structure of 
religious education. Emphasizing that “in Bosnia and Herzegovina traditionally 
good relations between the religious communities and churches exist”, the 
head of the Religious Service at “Preporod” (a sort of a “public relations” 
section of the Islamic Community)41 Muharem Omerdich stresses upon the 
significance of the Islamic spiritual education. 42 In the framework of each one 
of the so-called traditional religious communities this type of education is 
regulated by a law.   
The Islamic community in Bosnia has mektebs where religious education 
is carried out under the control of an Imam. High religious education lasts for a 
period of four years and is carried out in eight madrasas. Higher Islamic 
education is offered by two Islamic Pedagogical Academies: one of them is in 
Bihac while the other is situated in Mostar. The latter is affiliated with “Djemal 
Biedic” University of Mostar which is a state institution.  There are also two 
faculties: the Islamic Pedagogical Faculty in Zenica which provides education 
of teachers of religion, as well a Department of social services.   The Faculty 
of Islamic Sciences (FIS) in Sarajevo which is the most prestigious religious 
educational institution offers two types of education: theological and 
                                            
41 This institution has also a website (www.preporod.com). The fact that the site is only in 
Bosnian, shows that it is directed mainly to Bosnian Muslims on the territory of the country. 
42 Interview of the author with Muharem Omerdich, Sarajevo, March 22nd 2006. 
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pedagogical ones. The Faculty of Islamic pedagogy in Zenica has about 300 
students while the FIS in Sarajevo has about 500 students, both regular and 
correspondence students. The FIS has also post-graduate students. At 
present, the number of the students who study at the FIS is about 150. It 
offers Master and Ph.D. Degrees; because of the high level of its cadres, the 
FIS has already started carrying out a good cooperation with the University of 
Sarajevo.  
Aiming at a better level of coordination between the religious communities, 
there is a special Interreligious Council comprised by representatives of the 
four main religious communities: the Islamic, the Jewish, the Catholic and the 
Orthodox ones. This Council is informal and was established as a temporary 
solution with the hope that it will facilitate rapprochement among the religious 
communities and their actions. Out of Bosnia, the Council has been 
acknowledged by some of the European states, in Japan and America. The 
Interreligious Council is obviously one of the steps that the Bosnian society 
and state are trying to undertake on the way of the slow overcoming of sharp 
controversies. Putting down of the hate accumulated in a certain country the 
main city of which is marked by graveyards, will not be easy; the population of  
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Bosnia for a long time will keep on looking upon the concept of “tolerance” as 
something artificial which most probably they will be able to experience 
personally after two generation. Today, in the best case, we could speak 
about an “antagonistic tolerance”, enforced by the pragmatic requirements of 
the political and social life and the international community in the post-war 
period.          
 In a discussion on the issue of tolerance the chief secretary of “Preporod” 
Aziz Kadribegovic shared that having in mind the recent war in the country, 
Bosnia could hardly contribute with positive practices in this aspect.43 Hate 
and antagonism will also be overcome with difficulties according to the 
Director of the famous “Gazi Husrev” Library in Sarajevo Dr. Mustafa Jahic to 
whom this institution owes the rescue of hundreds of manuscripts during the 
time of the conflict. According to another scholar of the same library – Dr. 
Osman Lavic – the most terrific fact is that all these things will not pass in the 
course of time but rather the opposite: the accumulated hate will be 
transmitted to the future generations. According to him, “the first thing that a 
child learns from the parents is who his enemy is and which are the temples 
and cemeteries of the enemies which sooner or later he must crush”.44 
According to the French scholar Xavier Bugarel, re-Islamization in Bosnia 
leads to a transformation of the collective identity of the Islamic community 
without that corresponding to the relevant modifications in the individual 
behavior of its members. 45 This is also one of the reasons for the contentions 
and internal conflicts in the Islamic elite.    Consequently, this leads to 
cleavage of the Islamic community and the emergence of independent 
“cultural centers” and re-Islamization movements which break down the year-
lasting monopoly of the Islamic Community (Islamska Zaednitsa) over the 
religious life of Muslims. Some of them are bearers of ideas which are 
perceived in the traditional environment of Balkan Muslims as “radical” and 
“fundamentalist” – often because the dazzling cultural differences, but also 
sometimes because of the very views professed by them.          
                                            
43 Interview of the author with Aziz Kadribegovic, Sarajevo, March 22nd 2006.. 
44 Interview of the author with Mustafa Jahic and Osman Lavic, Sarajevo, March 23rd 2006. 
45 Xavier Bougarel, How Panislamism Replaces Communism, Part 3, July 2, 1999. 
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Just like the tendencies in the other Balkan states and the other countries 
of the world as well, the bearers of radical interpretations of Islam in Bosnia 
are usually propagandist’s representatives of the young generation. Some of 
them have returned to their countries with a diploma obtained abroad, while 
others have been fighting in the famous brigade of the Mujahidins which is a 
Para-military formation that acted in Central Bosnia during the war in the 
period between 1992–1995. According to some observers, in spite of the 
distrain over the activity of a number of humanitarian organizations in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina because of the accusations that they supported relations 
with “Al-Qaeda”, recently it has been observed intensification of the activity of 
some Islamic groups, considered to be “radical”. Two of them have a chief 
importance and provide a basis for the accusations of fundamentalism: the 
“Muslim Brotherhood” and the Active Islamic Youth (AIY).     
 In the beginning of 2002 in Sarajevo was established a branch of the 
Egyptian organization and movements of the “Muslim Brotherhood” whose 
activity has been expanding over the years that followed. It is not quite clear to 
what extent the organization has succeeded in using the already established 
charity network as a primary basis for developing its activity.   It is directed 
mainly to the families of Muslims returning to the territory of the Republic of 
Serbia, meanwhile working in cooperation with the Bosnian humanitarian 
organization of “Sedra”. The analysis of the accusations against them in the 
public space, however, one has to consider always the fact that the “Muslim 
Brotherhood” in Egypt left behind long ago the “revolutionary stage” of its 
ideology and social practice; the present core of their current ideology is the 
idea of the reform (islah).    
The Zenica based AIY which has been acting in Sarajevo, as well as in 
Central Bosnia, and has become a symbol of Islamic rebirth and re-
Islamization on the territory of the country. Among youth organizations, 
together with the “Young Muslims”, it enjoys the largest share of popularity. 
Registered as early as 1995, this organization claims that it has over 2000 
members, the majority of them being students. Among their main ideas stays 
the idea of the defense of Muslims from encroachments upon them.   For 
example, in 2002 supporters of the AIY embarked upon series of 
demonstrations in Sarajevo against the deportation of six Algerians accused 
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of developing terrorist activity.46  These actions, together with other similar 
ones, provide sufficient ground for the search of possible interdependencies in 
building of Islamic transnational network which aims at supporting terrorism. 
The ground of such accusations is also provided by the sources of finance of 
these organizations which generally come from Middle Eastern countries. 
Very often they do not imply a direct membership, but rather different levels of 
“affiliation” and “bounds” which is a borrowing from the historically established 
scheme of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood”.       
One of the founders of the AIY – Muris Cupic being himself a former fighter 
– several times stated that there was no danger of the spreading of militant 
Islam over Bosnia. But his fellows from the AIY have often been identified with 
the people who promote fundamentalism on the local level.  They come up 
with sharp critics towards the local Muslims that they do not behave as “true 
believers” and have been too much influenced by their Christian neighbors. 
The AIY have been inspected after the terrorist attacks on September 11th 
2001 and it has been found that they have been financed by the Saudi 
foundation of Al-Haramayn (“The Two Holy Places”, i.e. Mecca and Medina) 
which was later on declared by the USA to be one of the sponsors of “global 
terrorism”.   
 The official Islamic Community of Bosnia headed by the reis-ul-ulama Prof. 
Dr. Mustafa Ceric has often been represented as an institution which is trying 
to assimilate the “fundamentalist” groups that originated under foreign 
influence, including those ones among them that profess views in total 
contradiction with the “official” Islam. The person of Ceric himself influences 
upon this policy of the Sarajevo Islamic Community, who defended a Ph.D. at 
the University of Chicago and recently got the UNESCO intercultural 
understanding prize. He succeeds into finding a balance of his own between 
“Islam” and the West and convincing the West that Bosnia is a reliable 
European partner, meanwhile establishing and maintaining contacts with 
conservative Muslims in the country and the Middle East. In an interview from 
2005, given before the Saff Islamic youth magazine, Ceric rejected the 
                                            
46 Trofimov, Yaroslav. “Seeds of Hate: In Postwar Bosnia. Militant Islam Turns US Allies to 
Enemies”, Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2002, A.1. 
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statement that fundamentalist organizations such as the AIY should not be 
considered to be a part of the Islamic Community in Bosnia, saying that “the 
Islamic Community is more important than me, us or them. All of us constitute 
the Islamic Community.” In that sense Mustafa Ceric has succeeded into 
building himself an image of a leader who successfully communicates with 
even the most vehement supporters of fundamentalist Islam.                
The result of this policy is the transformation of the relations existing 
between the official Islamic Community representing as a whole the traditional 
interpretation of Islam in Bosnian territories  on one hand, and the “new faces”, 
often related to organizations defined as fundamentalist, on the other. In this 
way Mustafa Ceric and the organs of the Islamic Community, together with the 
Bosnian “Preporod” participate adequately in building the new religious public 
sphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In the case of Bosnia in this “competition 
for the souls of the people”, defined by the sociologist Peter Burger as a 
“religious market’, really diverse people and organizations participate but the 
Islamic Community succeeded into preserving its authority even in the new 
conditions. Even more, former critics and “competitors” of the official religious 
authorities such as the AIY and “Furqan” already seem inclined to 
acknowledge the authority of the Islamic Community, although they insist 
upon their right to act independently from its administrative organs. The 
situation has gone so far that the AIY and the Islamic Community even 
organize cooperate events (seminars, lectures in mosques etc.) which shows 
that the “assimilation policy” carried out by Mustafa Ceric, works successfully 
on the Bosnian ground.   
Many of the accusations directed towards the Bosnian humanitarian 
organizations, are most probably exaggerated, but one thing is sure – 
introducing of a foreign cultural model from Middle Eastern societies could 
lead to a de-culturation of Bosnian Muslims by means of Islamic religion. The 
question is to what extent this model could be spread in other Balkan 
countries too, fro example Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, even Bulgaria 
and Greece. The answer to this question requires drawing a prognostic outline 
of the possible future development of re-Islamization processes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In the short run, as well as the middle-term perspective, some 
key problems could be pointed out.        
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Sociologically and economically speaking, a great problem is represented 
by the deepening differences between rural and urban areas of the country, 
and particularly the present high level of unemployment in towns which is still 
estimated at about 40%. 47  This, consequently, will impede integration of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina into the EU, meanwhile giving rise to problems for 
the very process of state building. The problems concerning the return of 
Bosnian refugees also have a primary importance; they constitute a major 
obstacle before the normal development of the society and state; Bosnian 
refugees are one of the main target groups of the Islamic organizations 
penetrating from the Middle East. The inadequate nature of the measures 
related to “antiterrorism” which do not take into consideration the cultural 
peculiarities and religious identity of the indigenous population, could also 
have a negative a negative effect instead of the positive one.    
In that sense, it is necessary to distinguish clearly the organizations, thus 
avoiding classifying all of them under the common category of 
“fundamentalism” and “terrorism”. Besides that, an important division should 
be made, distinguishing between re-Islamization (which is a natural process 
not only in Bosnia) and the Islamic activism as a movement, connecting 
Islamic religion with politics. Re-Islamization does not always represent the 
first step towards Islamic activism in the political sense of the term. A proof of 
that is given by the development of “public Islam” in the rest of the countries of 
the Western Balkans.        
  
                                            
47 “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2004”, Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State). 
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2.3 Sandzak: a new religious dynamic of the territory of Serbia  
The population of the present state of Serbia and Montenegro numbers about 
10,832,000 people who ethnically and religiously speaking are distributed in 
the following way:     
 
Ethnical Groups 
5%
62,6%
16,5%
3,3%
12,6%
Serbs
Albanians
Montenegrians
Hungarians
Other
 
 
Religious communities 
4%
19%
65%
1%
11%
Catholics
Mus;lims
Orthodox Chrsitians
Protestants
Other
 
The region of Sandzak which is situated between Serbia and Montenegro 
has a population of about 530,000 people; Bosnian Muslims represent about 
67% while the rest are Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians etc. The population of 
Sandzak is represented in the UNPO by the Muslim National Council of 
Sandzak. This organization was established in order to defend the individual 
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and collective rights of the people in the region, so that Sandzak gains a 
special status.   
The main city of the region of is Novi Pazar and the emerging religious 
dynamic of the Muslim community around it are particularly important for the 
understanding of the new processes in Islam in the Balkans. The Sandzak 
region enjoys a significant demographic prevalence of Muslims: about 80% of 
them profess Islam; just in the region of Novi Pazar there are about 37 
mosques, 25 of them are found in the very city. In spite of that, however, 
Muslim leaders of Novi Pazar, such as the Director of the “Ghazi Isa-Beg” until 
recently Mevlud-efendi Dudic, a present Dean of the Faculty of Islamic 
Sciences at the International University in the city, shares that the model of 
Novi Pazar is a unique one. 48  Among the reasons for this mutual 
understanding among Serbs and Muslims in Sandzak, Dudic emphasizes 
upon the traditional “Balkan” model, as well as the “mutual recognition” – 
something that often lacks in relations between Christians and Muslims in the 
Balkans. The Mufti of Novi Pazar Sead Shakirovic explains another fact with 
the good relations existing between Christians and Muslims: Sandzak, 
situated between Kosovo and Bosnia, was the only region which did not 
witness military operations and conflicts between Muslims and Christians.49 
What gives rise to a problem of Muslims, is not only their ethnical 
identification as Bosniaks and the claim that they speak a “Bosnian” language, 
but rather their aspiration to be institutionally bound not to the Muslim 
leadership in Belgrade but rather to the Islamic Community in Sarajevo. It is 
not an accident that the young Mufti of Belgrade Mohamed Yusufspahic 
expresses his concern, speaking about the separatism of Muslims in 
Vojvodina, who would like to separate it from Serbia and Montenegro and to 
join Hungary; in Kosovo, which has its own Mufti Administration responsible 
also for some other communities out of the region, inhabited by Albanians; in 
Sandzak where Muslims identify themselves as Bosniaks who are Slavonized 
Albanians and not Islamized Serbs, and who would like to separate from 
Serbia and Montenegro, and to join Bosnia and Herzegovina etc.  
                                            
48 Personal communication of the author with Mevlud-efendi Dudic, Novi Pazar, March 20th 
2006. 
49 Personal communication of the author with Sead Shakirovic, Novi Pazar, March 21st 2006. 
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In Sandzak there are centuries-long traditions in the field of Islamic studies 
and spiritual education. In Novi Pazar there are two Islamic high schools 
(madrasa); the madrasa for the training of men – “Ghazi Isa-Beg” has a 
centuries-long tradition and represents one of the most prestigious ones on 
the Balkans. It is not a surprise that the Muslim community in Novi Pazar 
initiated the establishment of a Higher Islamic educational institution in the city, 
namely the International University; its Rector is the Sandzak Mufti Zukorlic. 
Four years ago a Higher Islamic education institutional department was 
founded; that is the Faculty of Islamic Sciences at the University in Novi Pazar.     
In Novi Pazar over 90% of the population attend classes of religion in 
schools. In Muslim High and Higher education schools not only the doctrines 
of Islam are studied, but also the doctrines of other religions professed in 
Serbia. Of course, the emphasis falls mainly upon Orthodox Christianity. As a 
proof of the latter serves the fact that the lectures on Orthodox Christianity are 
delivered by Proto-Presbyter Prof. Radovan Bigovic, Dean of the Faculty of 
Theology at the University of Belgrade, who is one of the leading Orthodox 
theologians not only on the Balkans but also in the world.  
What is exactly the uniqueness of the example given by Sandzak and Novi 
Pazar, apart from the peaceful coexistence of ethnical and religious 
communities which is typical for other Balkan territories? Compared with the 
global challenges put forth nowadays, related also to the penetration of 
religious and cultural influences from the Middle East countries, influences 
foreign to the Balkan Muslims, Novi Pazar also has to offer interesting 
examples.  Many of the representatives of its religious elite, among whom 
stand also the above-mentioned Dudic and Shakirovic, have obtained their 
spiritual education in the Arab world. This sort of religious education, however, 
in their case has not led to the deculturation, usually observed in such cases. 
Just the opposite – due to their strong tradition in the local interpretation of 
Islam, Muslim leaders of Novi Pazar remain faithful to it, developing it in an 
adequate way in the new conditions, mainly by means of education and public 
life.   
  
2.4 Kosovo: between secular nationalism and return of religion 
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The region of Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission (UNMIK) since June 1999, appointed by virtue of 
resolution № 1244 of the Security Council of the United Nations. This 
administration of the international community is supported by the Albanians in 
Kosovo, while the official authorities of Serbia oppose the imminent 
independence of Kosovo.  The difficult process of imposing multiethnic 
democracy in Kosovo is meanwhile accompanied by the refusal of ethnical 
Albanians to agree upon the demarcation of the border line with Macedonia in 
compliance with the agreement reached in 2000 between Macedonia, on one 
hand, and Serbia and Montenegro, on the other.      
The population of Kosovo is estimated to number about 1.9 million people; 
according to the World Bank data from 2000, 88% of them are Albanians, 7% 
are Serbs, and about 5% belong to other ethnical groups. The majority of 
Kosovo Muslims are Sunni, while the Serbs are Orthodox Christian. Among 
Albanians a very small percentage of Catholics and Orthodox Christians are 
found. According to the most recent statistical data, the present ethnical 
situation in Kosovo is as follows: 91% Albanians, 5% Serbs, 4 % other 
minority groups. The percentage of the ethnical Albanian population has 
increased as a result of the war in Kosovo.  
Kosovo, apart from the Serbian minority and the small number of Catholics, 
is almost exclusively comprised of Muslims who are explicitly secularly 
minded.  
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Despite its definitely secular nationalism, the Albanians in Kosovo are also 
engaged in the process of re-Islamization, although they do that in a totally 
different manner from the Bosniaks and other Slavonic speaking Muslims on 
the Balkans. The institution of the Islamic Community in Prishtina, headed by 
the reis-ul-ulama Naim Tarnava, a representative of the middle generation of 
leaders who obtained their education in Cairo, is still resolving important 
problems in the postwar period. The main ones among them are the very 
building of the institution, the constitution of a native, Albanian Muslim elite of 
Kosovo and the restoration of the Muslim temples destroyed during the 
military conflicts. Under the leadership of Naim Tarnava the Islamic 
Community is building itself an image of an institution opened for a dialogue 
with the Muslim countries, including the Arab states, as well as with the West, 
including the USA.         
Together with this “official Islam”, just like the rest of the countries of the 
Western Balkans, ideas are also spread in Kosovo that are perceived by the 
majority as “radical” of “fundamentalist”, due to their foreign cultural origin. 
Here we can also observe the typical conflict between generations, where the 
bearers of the fundamentalist ideas are mainly young graduates of the Arab 
Universities, often accused of preaching Wahhabism. The leader of this 
movement is considered to be the 29-years’ old Albert Haziri-Zejdi, who 
graduated his education in Jordan.   In Kosovo, however, still there is no local 
organized structure of these more conservative Islamic movements. After the 
war a lot of official charity and humanitarian organizations operate in the 
country, such as the World Islamic League through the “Islamic Help” (Al-
Ighatha Al-Islamiya) organization. Just similar to the “King Fahd” Islamic 
Culture Center that operates in Sarajevo, these organizations are, of course, 
foreign to the local population with respect of their culture, but although their 
ideology is a conservative one, this does not automatically mean that they 
provide support for radical Muslim groups.      
The leaders of the Islamic Community in Kosovo, like the religious leaders 
in Bosnia, have ambivalent relations with these foreign representatives. On 
one hand, they support official contacts with them, but on the other, they do 
not let them occupy key positions which could have influence on larger 
masses of the local population. This represents an obstacle to the possibility 
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that these organizations build parallel structures competing with the official 
religious organs of the Islamic Community in Kosovo.  
  
 
2.5 Islam in the Republic of Macedonia: new challenges 
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Muslims in Macedonia belong to five ethnical groups: Albanians, Turks, 
Roma, Macedonian Muslims (more widely known as Torbeshi or Pomaks, i.e. 
Slavs who adopted Islam in the Islamic period) and Bosnians. Contrary to 
Pomaks in Greece and Bulgaria, the Torbeshis are officially acknowledged by 
the Macedonian state as constituting a separate ethnical group. The majority 
of Muslims in Macedonia are Sunni, while the other small art of them are 
Bektashi.  
Many of the representatives of the minorities in Macedonia collide with 
great political and technical problems when applying for a Macedonian 
citizenship after the independency of this former Yugoslavian republic has 
been declared. It is difficult to provide objective statistical data for the real 
number of Muslims in Macedonia. The leaders of the different ethnical 
communities give the following figures: Albanians are about 40% of the 
population,50 Turks vary between 170,000 and 200,000, and Bosnians are 
                                            
50 CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (1992). Report on the US 
Helsinki Commission Delegation to Hungary, Greece, Macedonia and Croatia (Washington: 
CSCE), р.13.  
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about 60,000-80,000, while Roma are about 200,000.51 In any case, we could 
speak about more than half a million of Muslims.  
The officially registered Islamic community in the Republic of Macedonia is 
being regulated according to the rules that were accepted in 1994. This 
religious community has four main organizational organs: the reis-ul-ulama, 
the Executive Council (Mejlisi Shura), The Financial and Juridical Council 
(Mejlis) and the offices of the Muftis.52 The reis-ul-ulama is the leader of the 
Islamic community and has great legal power as far as administrative and 
executive authorities are concerned.  
The executive council consists of 23 members and works in six main 
spheres, i.e. religious education, science and culture, information and 
publications, administrative and financial sector, and sector that takes care of 
the waqf property. This council includes all of the Muftis, the Director of the 
High Islamic School, the Rector of the Islamic Faculty of Theology, the 
Director of the humanitarian organization of El-Hilal, the Directors of the six 
main spheres of work of the Council, the head of the Association of Imams 
and five experts in law, economy, political and economy sciences, who are 
appointed by the reis-ul-ulama.  
The humanitarian organization El-Hilal is functioning within the 
organizational structure of the Islamic Community.  El-Hilal was established in 
1991 as an association of the Muslims and was transformed in a humanitarian 
organization in December 1993. It has five branches in Skopje and nine ones 
outside the Macedonian capital. Its chief activities are related to the 
distribution of humanitarian aid, the support of events in the sphere of culture, 
support of refugees, education of children with unfavorable social status.  
According to the tradition, the inter-confessional relation between the 
Islamic community and the Orthodox Church and the Macedonian majority, 
are quite wintry and self-contained. These relations have become more 
strained in the last years after the independency of Macedonia (1992-1993). 
In that time, the myth of the “Muslim conspiracy” which puts Orthodox 
                                            
51 Human Rights Watch (HRW) (1996). A Threat to “Stability”: Human Rights Violations in 
Macedonia (New York: Human Rights Watch /Helsinki), р.68. 
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Christianity in danger appeared.  In the course of time, the strong opposition 
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims gradually subsided, but obviously 
politicizing of religion still continued to exist. The social division between them 
also remained evident.  The cases of mixed marriages are very rare. The 
Orthodox Christians look upon Muslims as a monolith group while Muslims 
feel like “second-hand” citizens in their own country.   
After more than one year of internal political disturbances and turmoil, 
including many cases of violence, the Head of the Islamic Community in 
Macedonia, the reis-ul-ulama Arif Emini, was forced to resign from his office in 
June 2005. The pressure upon him was exerted on behalf of the wing of 
Zenon Berisha who wanted to gain leadership over Muslims. Berisha and his 
followers were accused of pro-Wahhabi tendencies. The society of Macedonia 
was shocked when Emini was taken as a hostage in his office by some of the 
people of Berisha. In 2001, when Macedonia was seized by turmoil, this was 
mainly due to the aspiration to draw ethnical lines of distinguishment and 
Islam has never played a significant role in this conflict. Some days after the 
resignation of Emini, a group of imams from Skopje was attacked and beaten. 
Later on, the chief Imam of the Skopje “Hudaverli” Mosque Shaban Ahmeti 
stated before the Utrinski Vestnik newspaper: “The people who attacked us, 
were undoubtedly representatives of the radical Islam, or, as we call them – 
Wahhabis, supporters of Zenon Berisha”.   
Not all of the people support he view that the conflicts in the Islamic 
community represent a proof in favor of the existence of clear separation 
among the Macedonian Albanians who profess Islam. In January 2006 the 
International Crisis Group, based in Brussels, concluded that “in spite of the 
insinuations that differences have their ground in religious theology, religion is 
rarely mentioned during discussions as a reason for conflicts within the 
community.  The access to real estate, money and influence is the main issue 
of conflict. This is equivalent to what the leading Albanian politician Arben 
                                                                                                                             
52 Islamska Zaednitsa (1997). Islamska zaednitsa i nejzinite institutsii [The Islamic Community 
and Its Institutions], a brochure in Albanian, Turkish and Macedonian, (Skopje: Albina Gold), 
р.67. 
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Xhaferi stated, namely that “contemporary politicians and leaders 
instrumentalize religion to achieve their own goals”.53  
At this stage of the development of the situation in the Republic of 
Macedonia, there are no sufficient arguments to assert that fundamentalist 
interpretations of Islam could have a long-lasting impact upon the Muslims in 
the country. The present reis-ul-ulama Bahri Aliu has some priorities, among 
which the most significant role for the activity of the Islamic Community is 
played by the following items:  a pursuit to introduce classes of religion in 
state schools; restitution of the waqf property and enhancing the status of the 
Islamic Community similarly to the Macedonian Orthodox Church.54  All of 
these problems to a certain extent are also typical for other countries on 
Southeastern Europe, where Muslims are “a great minority”.  
                                            
53 Interview with Arben Xhaferi, Tetovo, March 17th 2006. 
54 Interview with Bahri Aliju, Skopje, March 16th 2006. 
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3. Islam and Public Policy in Bulgaria 
The transition of Bulgaria from a totalitarian to a democratic system created 
an expectation that public policy might work to reconcile the public interest 
with social justice. Although the government did guarantee the rights of 
religious denominations in general, public policy has largely ignored the 
challenges related to religion, particularly Islam. This ignorance of Islam as a 
religion and social practice among Bulgaria’s elite and influential policy 
makers ensures an official ambivalence towards the Muslim minority. We can 
consider the example of how the government handled the centers of Islamic 
religious education – an issue that has recently come to the forefront of public 
policy debate. Not only do governmental bodies such as the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs not have any updated communication strategies for these 
Muslim institutions, both the secondary and higher Islamic schools in Bulgaria 
are chronically under funded. The state, claiming an explicitly secular 
character, refuses to provide any financial support, categorizing religious 
schools as “private,” and thereby denying them access to government support. 
In turn, that means that religious schools remain relatively isolated from other 
academic institutions. Furthermore, limited access to international academic 
cooperation has resulted in Islamic religious schools relying on foreign 
religious foundations for scholarships and fellowships to study and specialize 
abroad.  The academic marginalization which has been tacitly “encouraged” 
by the government, forces these educational institutions to remain 
independent of local development and international secular cooperation. They 
have become an object of suspicion in mainstream Bulgarian society – a 
mistrust that is reinforced by the lack of public access to the educational and 
research activities of these schools. 
What is increasingly important for Bulgaria, and more broadly of Southeast 
Europe, is the impact of the global events related to Islam on the relations 
between the Muslim community and mainstream society. The central issue is 
whether conflictual relations on an international level will be internalized into 
local reality, a situation that could easily be realized within the emerging new 
religious public sphere. If we take into consideration the traditional secularist 
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approaches that prevail in public policy making towards religious and minority 
communities, this could be fast becoming a pressing issue. 
A typical example of this problem can again be found in the educational 
sector. During the 45 years of communist rule, there was no religious 
instruction in mainstream Bulgarian schools.  It was only in 1997-1998 and 
1999-2000 that courses on Christianity and Islam were (respectively) 
reintroduced.  Nevertheless, mainstream public policy still relies on traditional 
secularist strategies, which as a rule attempt to avoid religion. This is 
consistent in the teaching of religion in mainstream (secular) schools even 
though proper religious instruction could foster a new type of informed 
understanding adequate to address today’s challenges. Religious instruction 
remains conservative, ethnocentric and dogmatic and religion’s basic moral 
values are represented as exclusive, with little or no attention to interfaith 
relations, either in an ethical/theological or practical/social sense. Religious 
education is cut off from broader social and political development and, rather 
than supporting social integration and building bridges, it perpetuates if not 
exacerbates divides between Christian and Muslim populations. The influence 
of religious instruction will increase with time, so it is crucial that it stops acting 
as an impediment to inter-religious relations.  More academic and intercultural 
competence must be brought towards curriculum development and instruction. 
3.1 Islam in Wider Europe Context: Towards Bridging the Divides 
from the Balkans with Bulgaria as an EU member 
The appearance of Muslim population in the Bulgaria territories, as well as the 
Balkan region as a whole, is connected with their overtaking by the Ottoman 
Empire around the beginning of the 14th century. Muslims from Anadola came 
to inhabit what are now Bulgarian territories around the end of the 14th century, 
as usually they live in compact communities. The historical studies testify that 
the present Muslim communities in the Balkans have been formed gradually 
during the centuries under the impact of various factors. The historical fate of 
those communities has been built in the course of a complex, historically 
conditioned process, in which took part the conquerors from Asia Minor and 
other Muslim immigrants, as well as the local Islamized population.  
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Apart from the assumptions that even before the Ottoman conquest in our 
lands was settled Islam professing population, only the conquest and 
permanent subjection of the Bulgarian territories by the Ottoman Empire at the 
end of the 14th century brought about the demographic, institutional and 
economic conditions for the development of Muslim culture and self-
consciousness here. The problems that arose around the appearance and 
growth of the population that professed Islam in Bulgaria and in the Balkans 
are very old and much developed in academic studies. Still, the main ways 
through which that was accomplished remained two, namely colonization of 
Muslim population and Islamization of natively-born population.   The 
colonization of Turks and Islamic elements as a whole did not affect equally all 
parts of the Bulgarian lands and more generally speaking the Balkans, but 
rather was concentrated in particular regions for which this was one of the 
factors that determined the characteristics of the historical and cultural 
processes there.  
Together with that, however, there was another parallel process, probably 
more profoundly affecting the demographic situation, namely the process of 
adopting Islam by the native population. According to most scholars of the 
Ottoman Empire, exactly Islamization proved to be the decisive factor for the 
increase of the number of Muslim population in the Balkans and the Bulgarian 
territories in particular. Together with that, however, there has been an years-
lasting debate in Bulgarian historiography on the reasons and the ways of 
adopting Islam, as well as on the role of Ottoman authority. 
The result of these briefly sketched historical processes was that on the 
territory of Bulgaria and Bulgarian lands appeared compact Muslim 
communities. In a most general manner, they are divided into two groups: 
Turkish speaking Muslims and Muslim population, speaking Slavonic 
languages (or Albanian in the West Balkans). Here we have to add also the 
Roma Muslims, who – just like the Roma Christians – have been suspiciously 
looked upon by the representatives of both religions and definitely were not 
considered to belong to one faith with them.    
3.2 Islam and the Modern Bulgarian State 
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After the Liberation from the Ottoman rule in the period between 1877–78 
and the rise of the modern Bulgarian state Orthodox Christianity was 
proclaimed to be the “dominant religion”, although the members of ethnical 
and religious groups were acknowledged to be Bulgarian citizens enjoying 
equal rights. In spite of that our history knows series of acts of violence and 
deportation campaigns carried by some of the Bulgarian governments 
targeting building of as homogenous single-nation state as possible.  
The changes of the names of members of the Bulgarian minorities after 
the Liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman rule – changes that gave rise to 
controversial academic and public discussions – together with propaganda 
and pragmatic political purposes, had also a more profound meaning. As a 
whole, changes of names were used to break off a tradition or a historical 
heritage. Changes of names of settlements or streets have been a common 
practice in Bulgaria since the establishment of the modern state at the end of 
the 19th century – a practice which, by the way, depended upon the dominant 
ideology. Until the Second World War these changes of names were meant 
on the first place to extinguish Ottoman heritage. They constituted an element 
of the large scale de-Ottomanisation of Bulgarian society, which was reflected 
in the outer look of many settlements.  
The de-Ottomanisation process also affected the population. During the 
Balkan wars in the period between 1912–1913 for the first time portion of the 
Muslim population was forcedly converted to Christianity. Particularly affected 
by this forced conversion was the Pomak population along the Bulgarian-
Greek border. In this way the Bulgarian speaking Muslim population had to 
adopt the second important (next to language) attribute of the Bulgarian 
nationality, namely the Orthodox Christianity faith. With this conversion into 
Christianity the new Christians were also given Christian names which erased 
one of the outer distinguishing distinctions between Christians and Muslims. 
Together with that the abrogation of such forced conversions turned into a 
part of the political agenda of the rulers in case that they strove towards 
providing for the support of the Pomaks.  That is exactly what the government 
of Radoslavov did after the Balkan wars, as well the Fatherland Front after the 
Second World War.  
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The totalitarian communist order in its turn made Muslim communities in 
our country face multiple difficulties and hardships. Led by its desire to turn 
Bulgaria into a single-nation country, this regime embarked upon series of 
attempts to assimilate Pomaks, as well as ethical Turks. The state policy of 
forced assimilation began during the 50’s of the 19th century with the abolition 
of newspapers and schools and went on through series of changes of names 
of Bulgarian Muslims. In 1972-1974 the names of Pomaks were substituted 
for Bulgarian ones, while in 1984-1985 the so called “rebirth process” took 
place; it was related to the events of the mass change of names of the 
ethnical Turks.      
This process was grounded on the presumption that all of the Muslims in 
Bulgaria are Bulgarians who adopted Islam during the age of the Ottoman 
Empire; therefore they needed “awakening” in order to realize their true 
national identity. In the spring and summer of 1989 the ethnical Turks of 
Bulgaria started mass protests in North-Eastern and South Bulgaria raising 
claims to restore their original names. Protest burst out, which were put down 
with the help of the police and the army and innocent victims fell. The 
oppositional behavior of the ethnical Turks led to a change of strategy of the 
communist regime which enabled them to leave the country by opening the 
border with neighboring Turkey. The same year just during the time period 
between June and August about 300,000 ethnical Turks-Bulgarian citizens left 
Bulgaria, finding a refuge in Turkey.        
It must be noted that the changes of names that took place during the 
communist rule did not target achieving the same goals as the previous 
Bulgarian regimes. A task of a primary importance of the communist 
government was to hinder the Roma and the Pomaks from associating with 
the Turkish minority. In the case of the Pomaks this task was related to the 
argument that the change of names restored “the historical truth” and thus the 
Pomaks were returned back to the cradle of Bulgarian civilization which they 
had been forced to leave some centuries ago with their conversion to Islam, 
either forcedly or voluntarily. The fact that such argument has never been 
referred to during the change of names of the Pomaks makes this justification 
even more unlikely. When later on the Turkish population also fell victim to the 
change of names, once again the primary goal was to carry out a “divide and 
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conquer” type of a policy.  The priority objective in this case was to cut off the 
relation between the Turks in Bulgaria and Turks in Turkey. The research 
efforts to justify it that were undertaken at the end of the process of changing 
of names were so great also because of the fact that the Turkish population of 
the country even before the war developed a “strong Turkish conscience”. 
This conscience was all the more affirmed by the bonds of relation that 
existed with neighboring Turkey. Besides that, the Bulgarian Communist Party 
hoped that through the change of names the Turkish community will join the 
Bulgarian nation. These hopes nevertheless proved to be mistaken. 
After the democratic changes in 1989 the role of Islam in Bulgaria has 
undergone a significant change. With the fall of the Communist regime the 
rights of the Muslim minority have been restored. The existence of religious 
freedom and multi-party political system enabled the existence of an ethnical 
party of the Bulgarian Turks, namely Movement for Rights and Freedoms 
which in the last years has developed also as a liberal political organization 
taking part for the second time in the ruling coalition. In a political pluralism 
and religious freedom environment the traditional for our territories system to 
administrate the religious affairs of Muslims started to operate, represented by 
the General Mufti Administration and its organs. In a normal environment it 
should bear responsibility for the activity of the Muslim mosques (at present 
numbering about 1040) and more than 500 hojjas and imams working in them.  
3.3 Demographic and Ethno-Religious Aspects 
At present the Muslim population in Bulgaria consist of ethnical Turks, 
Pomaks (Bulgarian Muslims) and Roma Muslims. According to the most 
recent census of the population from year 2001, about 12.2 % of the Bulgarian 
population confesses Islam. This relatively great portion of Muslims turns 
them into the greatest minority group in a country with dominantly Christian 
population (82.6 %).   Undoubtedly Islam is the dominant religion among 
ethnical Turks (1.3 % of them only are Christians). Although this has always 
been difficult to find out, at least according to the official census 131,531 
individuals (or 2%) of the Bulgarian ethnical community profess Islam. 
Muslims are more than one fourth (27.9 %) of the Roma population. The 
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charts on pages 5 and 6 show the share of those who profess Islam 
compared with the other religious communities in Bulgaria and respectively 
the distribution of Muslims according to ethnical criteria: 
 
Chart 1:  
Muslims’ share in the religious identity of Bulgarian citizens 
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Chart 2:  
Distribution of these 12.2% of Muslims among the ethnical groups 
that comprise them 
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one spread by the conquerors in the age of the Ottoman rule.  Together with 
Sunni Islam that has often been conventionally designated by specialists as 
“Islamic Orthodoxy”, among Muslims in Bulgaria are also found  
representatives of Shiism – a movement which acknowledges Ali – the cousin 
of the Prophet Muhammad and his son-in-law together with his successors – 
for leaders of the Muslim community (umma). Shiites in Bulgaria territories 
have been mainly associated with the community of the Kizilbashs (Alewis) or 
the Sufi mystical order of the Bektashi.  
The Kizilbashs (known as Alewis, as well as Ali-Ilahis or Alians) call 
themselves “People of Truth” and basically have been looked upon as a 
radical Shi‘a sect, as far as their religious dogmas are concerned. They have 
reached as far as to deify Ali and believe that God is associated with Ali in an 
inseparable way and consequently manifests Himself in emanations 
embodied by the Prophets Adam, Noah (Arabic Nuh), Abraham (Arabic 
Ibrahim), Moses (Arabic Musa), Jesus (Arabic Isa) and Muhammad himself, 
as well as by the saints and the Imams. In their rites the Alewi use books 
called “Exodus” (khuruj) that are kept in secret from the people outside of the 
sect. Among the things that characterize them are also night vigils and rituals 
and worshipping of local saints and totems. There are also things adopted 
from Christians who enjoy a special tolerance. Polygamy is rejected. This sect 
appeared in 15th – 16th centuries as an opposition to the Ottomans in Western 
Iran and Asia Minor. The very name “Kizilbashs” comes from the Turkish word 
for “red heads” and was related to the twelve red ribbons honoring the twelve 
Shia Imams which were used by the warriors of the Safavid dynasty (the 
dynasty that imposed Shiism as the ruling doctrine in Iran) to decorate their 
turbans during their conflict with the Ottoman state. Today Alewis number 
about 3 million people. The majority of them live in Turkey and partly Iran and 
Afghanistan while they are represented on the territory of Bulgaria by single 
communities only in the North-Eastern part.  
Generally speaking, however, Bulgarian Muslims from the three ethnical 
segments of the Islamic community in our country – ethnical Turks, Pomaks 
and Roma – are Sunni. The prevailing influence upon their spiritual life and 
rites is still exerted by interpretations and rituals inherited from the Ottoman 
period. What characterizes Sunni Islam is that it has no sects but rather four 
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main juridical schools – the Hanafi (to which belong Bulgarian Muslims by 
virtue of tradition dating from the Ottoman empire), Hanbali (today this school 
exerts a strong influence, for example among the Wahhabi Muslims in Saudi 
Arabia), Shafii and Maliki, the influence of which is weak in the Balkans. 
Although these schools are considered to be equal, sometimes there are 
serious differences in the interpretation of the Islamic sacred Law, namely the 
shari‘a.  
3.3.1 Ethnic Turks 
Ethnic Turks comprise the greatest community that professed the Islamic faith 
on the territory of modern Bulgaria – 746,664 people according to the official 
census. After the Liberation from the Ottoman rule in 1877-1878 and the rise 
of the Third Bulgarian State, Orthodox Christianity was proclaimed to be the 
“dominant religion” although minority ethnical and religious groups were 
acknowledged to be Bulgarian citizens enjoying equal rights. Even during the 
war between Russia and Turkey and especially after the Liberation the largest 
part of the subjects of emigrated to the neighboring territories   of the Ottoman 
Empire. According to the statistics in 1887 they were about 21.44% of the 
whole population of the newly created Bulgarian state. 
Considerable parts of the Bulgarian Turk (about 90.000) are Alewi Shiites. 
They inhabit the North-Eastern regions. What characterizes this community is 
still the relatively unfavorable educational structure (6% of them are illiterate) 
which hinders the optimal realization and fulfillment of those who belong to it. 
The fact that Turkish is the mother-tongue for 96.2% of the people belonging 
to this community serves as a proof that Islam still continues being a 
powerfully influencing factor in the process of self-identification in it.  
3.3.2 Pomaks 
Next to the ethnical Turks, Pomaks (often called also Bulgarian 
Mohammedans or even Slavonic speaking Muslims) are the biggest Muslim 
community – by estimates of specialists, their number ranges between 
200,000 and 250,000 people. They are Bulgarians and Bulgarian is their 
mother tongue but nevertheless their religion, everyday life and rituals are 
Islamic. The material culture of the Bulgarian Muslims who inhabit mainly the 
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Rhodopes region but also some parts of the Balkan mountain (Stara Planina) 
proves their Bulgarian ethnical identity; besides that, anthropologically 
speaking, they are one of the most prominent representatives of the Slavonic 
racial type. In 1880 their number was 20,000 while in 1920 their number had 
already reached 100,000 i.e. they have a higher birthrate compared with 
Bulgarian Muslims.   
Pomaks are also a community which is not quite inherently coherent. 
Some scholars define them as “a world of its own which is situated between 
Bulgarians and Turks”. The greatest problem around the Pomaks stems from 
their ethnical self-consciousness. What connects them with Bulgarians is their 
common ethnical origin while the connection between them and Turks is the 
common religion, namely Islam. In modern times the process of building self-
confidence in them and the establishment of relations with those who 
surround them is an extremely complex one. Some of them identify with Turks, 
others with Bulgarians, while a third group searches for its identity as Pomaks.  
Because of their complex historical fate, as well because of the 
permanently varying state policy towards them which was often related with 
violence, the Pomaks who live in the surroundings of Bulgarian Christians 
often tend to identify themselves as Turks. Pomaks, who inhabit the regions 
with compact Turkish minority, prefer to define themselves as Bulgarians. 
Some of them are even prone to convert to Christianity as a sign of being fully 
merged into the Bulgarian community. There is also a third subgroup whose 
presence in the public and spiritual life of the community has become more 
prominent in recent years. This group insists upon its own Pomak and Muslim 
identity and would not like to be integrated neither in Turks nor in Bulgarians.   
This third subgroup, asserting the existence of “a Pomak ethnical 
community (the term “nation” is usually avoided) has even already created its 
own “scientific” or quasi-scientific theory of its origin using the language and 
the arguments of the historical science. Probably the most important two 
elements in it are as follows: their self-exemption from belonging to Bulgarian 
medieval history (because of the two factors to form Bulgarian ethical identity, 
namely statehood and Christian religion) and the quest for their own ethnical 
origin in the age before the Ottoman conquest, implying that the Pomaks had 
adopted Islam directly from the Arabs. 
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It is important to note here that the exemption from the Bulgarian medieval 
history in no way indicates any anti-Bulgarian or even anti-Christian 
inclinations.  Just contrary to that, it is admitted that Bulgarian Christians and 
Bulgarian Muslims have common Slavonic and Thracian origins. What this 
quasi-scientific theory in fact denies, is the idea of treachery and apostasy 
from the Christian faith, promoted by official historiography in the course of 
decades. Precisely that fact lies in the basis of the assertions that Pomaks 
have not accepted Islam from the Ottoman Turks by preferring the more 
prestigious option of its adoption directly from Arabs.  
All these three groups of Bulgarian Muslims which have been shaped in 
that way according to their own desire fro self-identification as Bulgarians, 
Turks or Pomaks, are approximately equal in number.  
3.3.3 Roma Muslims 
Roma constitute a significant part of the population of Bulgaria. They came to 
settle down in Bulgarian territories in the beginning of the 13th century. The 
majority of them adopted Islam in the period between 16–17th centuries, but 
after the Liberation a great part of them goes back to Christian traditions. The 
official census indicates that their number is 370,908 but according to the 
experts, it is accepted that today their number id greater. In fact, although they 
usually define themselves either as Christians or Muslims, practically 
speaking, Roma often follow syncretic rituals combining elements of both 
Christianity and Islam (more than 55% of the Roma population in Bulgaria are 
Christians while in recent 10 years the share of Protestants among them has 
been rapidly increasing). Inside the two main religious groups of Roma we can 
observe a division of a lot of subgroups in accordance with their way and age 
of settling down, as well as with their professional occupations which has 
defined some specifics in the everyday life and the traditions of the subgroups. 
About 18% of the Roma do not define themselves as belonging to neither of 
the religious communities found in our country. This is indicative of the still 
weak influences of traditional faiths upon their ethnic community.  Considering 
these ethno-cultural and religious specifics of the Roma community, still it is 
one of the least homogenous.  
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Despite this common characteristic of Pomak religious life and its inherent 
syncretism, among Roma Muslims there could also be observed specific 
processes of re-Islamization. Ethnical and cultural differences between Roma 
and other Muslims in Bulgaria (Pomaks and ethnical Turks), as well the 
intensive demographic increase of this population make it extremely important 
to study the present-day processes, related to spread of Islam and following it.  
Generally speaking, Roma are more inclined to break off from the local 
traditions of Balkan Islam that are typical for Bulgarian territories. This makes 
them more yielding to foreign cultural and religious influence compared not 
only with ethnical Turks, but also with Pomaks.   
3.4 Islam in everyday life and the public sphere in Bulgaria 
During the last 15 years after the democratization process in the regions 
inhabited by Muslim population there has been running with a different degree 
of intensity a process of re-Islamization. It is a process that has its global 
grounds and dimensions, but besides that it is also affected by local traditions 
and ethno-cultural characteristics of the communities which profess Islam. In 
our country this is especially manifest by observing the distinct differences 
among the processes running in the spiritual life of Turks, Pomaks and Roma 
Muslims. As a direct consequence of the restored civil rights and religious 
freedoms in Bulgaria, just similar to other countries of Eastern Europe, there 
has been a process of going back to the religious roots; in that process the 
tendency of re-Islamization is related to the historical, cultural and doctrinal 
peculiarities of Islam itself.  
Until the democratic changes in Bulgaria the vast majority of Muslims in 
our country practiced the so-called “popular Islam” – a term used to imply that 
they have been observing some ritual traditions, part of which even contradict 
“Orthodox” Islamic doctrine. In fact until the end of the 80’s of the past century 
what was observed were not exactly the universally valid dogmas and rituals 
in Islam but rather the local customs and forms of religious belief. The 
freedoms that have been granted in the period since the end of 1989 until 
nowadays have brought Muslims to a new environment. Many of them re-
discover their religious roots and turn Islam into an important element of their 
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identity. Part of them went abroad to study Islamic theology and religious 
sciences – as a rule ethnical Turks traveled to the Republic of Turkey, while 
Pomaks were usually educated in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and other 
countries of the Middle East. 
According to geographical criteria, the role of religion in everyday life and 
public relations of Bulgarian Muslims, hence the degree of re-Islamization, 
have been quite diverse; they have always been affected by the specific 
ethno-cultural features of the relevant group of population. The Muslim 
community in North-Eastern Bulgaria and East Rhodopes region in its largest 
part is comprised of ethnical Turks who profess Islam by virtue of tradition 
(“popular Islam”). It has rather more ritual, celebrational and ethnographical 
meaning for the community that any other specifically religious importance.   
For the Muslims in these regions ethnical identity is much more important than 
the religious one. The Muslim community in the Western Rhodopes region 
consists of Bulgarian Muslims – the Pomaks.  Islam play a significant role in 
the community but since those people who profess it have no clear ethnical 
conscience – they waver among Bulgarian, Pomak and Turkish elements – 
the type of Islam that they profess, is mixed with a lot of ethnographical 
elements, i.e. caps, dresses etc. that are still considered to be very important 
symbols of the community. Here we can observe rather a clash of an isolated 
traditionally patriarchal community with modernity than religious confrontation 
or re-Islamization. Although the local imams are young people educated in 
Islam, even they prefer holding to local traditional forms of professing Islam by 
thinking that these forms play a significant role by forming the public identity. 
In spite of that, although here re-Islamization follows a different course in 
comparison with the Central Rhodopes region, it gradually leaves its stamp 
upon the everyday life and the public relations of the Muslim population.  
The most dynamic re-Islamization processes are the ones in the Muslim 
community in the Central Rhodopes. It is comprised of Bulgarian Muslims who 
in the different parts of the region represent from 30% to 90% of the 
population of the region. As a whole, the Islamic community in the Central 
Rhodopes has long ago resolved the issue of its ethnical and national identity. 
The existence of compact Christian population in the region – population with 
which the Muslim community has been always co-existing and maintaining 
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contacts – does not allow Muslim population to forget its Bulgarian ethnical 
origin during the Ottoman rule; the relations of kinship between Christians and 
Muslims that have been maintained also contribute strongly to that. Islam has 
always had a powerful impact upon the life of the Muslim community in the 
Central Rhodopes. It is the base upon which the identity of the community has 
been build. Without it the community would have shrunk from existence 
because it constitutes the only ground for distinction between its Bulgarian 
Christian and Bulgarian Muslim members. After 50 years of atheistic 
dictatorship the fall of the Communist regime quite naturally provoked a 
process of re-Islamization among the Muslims in the Central Rhodopes region.     
The re-Islamization process in Bulgaria coincided with a global process of 
reviving the religion of Islam in the countries with dominantly Muslim 
population as well as those ones among them in which Muslims constitute a 
minority. In the European Union itself “the Islamic theme” has become one of 
the most pressing ones; meanwhile authoritative commentators prognosticate 
that it will keep on defining the course of the further debates on the Old 
Continent. Precisely Islam turned to be the reason to carry out important 
expert and political discussions on the issues of the relations between religion 
and politics, as well as religion and the public sphere.  Issues which in the 
European context have been considered solved long ago, now again emerge 
to the surface. Thus, for example, because of the new rise of Islam, the issues 
of the “religious community”, the relation between freedom of conscience and 
religious freedom were also put forth, in a new light, though. The question of 
the religious symbols emerged, as well as the question about whether it is 
necessary to have specific laws for Muslims or observing common civil and 
criminal law should be enough.  
The religious regulations intrinsic to the Muslim community collide with 
some problems stemming from civil law (in France for example some female 
Muslim students refused to be examined by a male examiner, because Islam 
forbids being alone with outsiders among men). In Bulgaria some re-Islamized 
Muslims think that “if you keep the decrees of your religion, you are found to 
contradict some public norms” because in this country, as well as in the West 
“the unbelievers define the course of the everyday life of believers”. Among 
believing Bulgarians Muslims in the Rhodopes region has arisen a painful 
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dilemma: what is necessary to be followed in case of contradiction between 
what is stipulated by civil laws versus religion. Until now “popular Islam” in 
Bulgaria suggested not particularly strict adherence to fundamental dogmas 
and norms of the Islamic faith; contrary to that, re-Islamization leads to a 
profound change in the way of thinking of Muslims who go through it, and 
Pomaks on the first place who have been distanced from the “Turkish model”.  
As a rule in Islamic religion does not exist the division that characterizes 
Western democracies – the separation between what is secular and spiritual 
in the community life: “Religion, Islam – that is the whole life – politics, 
economy, and social sphere. There is no sphere of human activity which is not 
subject to religion. While in Christianity – such as it has arrived to us, and not 
such as it functioned – religion is separated from social life. Jesus is more 
bearer of spiritual, while with Mohammed we also enter the social sphere.” 
These are words shared by a Muslim participant in a focus group in the 
framework of the project – thoughts that by nothing differ from the way of 
thinking of many Muslims in the world. In this aspect the statement of another 
participant is also a typical one: “The problem is that right at the moment in 
Bulgaria, as well as among Muslims as a result of the 45 years passed 
prevails the way of thinking that separates religion as a spiritual sphere from 
its social and political aspect”. The conflict that emerged between 
representatives of the younger and the older generations of Muslims in the 
Rhodopes region, is not a coincidental one. Young people explain that fact 
with the religious ignorance of the older ones who have not been following 
“true Islam”, but rather local folklore traditions and religious delusions inherited 
by Turks. These views reflect the processes of re-Islamization and gradual 
break off with the local traditions of the “popular Islam” – a tendency which is 
hardly reversible, especially regarding the Central Rhodopes region, as well 
as to a great extent the Eastern Rhodopes region.   
These are serious challenges to the very legal basis of contemporary 
European democracies and these challenges could threaten the state of civil 
peace in some otherwise stable countries of the European Union. Although in 
Bulgaria there has been a century long model of peaceful co-existence 
between Christians and Muslims, our country is not protected against conflicts 
on that basis. The inevitable increase in the degree of re-Islamization 
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provoked the emergence of various processes in the different ethnical 
segments of the Islamic community in Bulgaria – some of them have entirely 
positive character (for example, observing religious moral values), others are 
neutral (for example, observance of usual Islamic rituals and rites), while 
others hide potential risks for the civil peace. Generally speaking, these 
processes are associated – especially by media which forms public 
tendencies – with the influx and influence of foreign religious and political 
factors.   
3.5 New Tendencies among Muslims in Bulgaria 
As a whole, the inherited model of peaceful ethnical and religious co-
existence that has been preserved until today, keeps on functioning 
successfully after the democratic changes. This mutual understanding is 
deservedly looked upon as an achievement of Bulgaria as it manifestly 
distinguishes our country in comparison with the vehement ethnical conflicts in 
the Western Balkans. At this stage Muslims in Bulgaria as a whole are 
moderate ones. At the same time, in the framework on the studies carried out 
“on the spot“, Muslims leaders from the Rhodopes region informally share that 
“the ice is thin” and “every mention of the word “religion” could lead to 
conflicts” which could be brought just by “one sparkle” because of the 
offenses accumulated in the past. The combination of these unfavorable 
factors and the historical aggravations combined with external influences in 
the last years could lead to emergence of fundamentalist moods among part 
of the Bulgarian population. Among these factors the key role is played by: 
• the social and economical problems in the regions inhabited by Muslims; 
• the unfavorable degree of integration of Bulgarian Muslim population, as 
far as education and culture are concerned; 
• the influence and the character of the process of re-Islamization; 
• the global processes related to Islam after 11th September 2001 and the 
public discussions on the situation of Muslims; 
• the penetration of foreign in cultural aspect religious influences upon the 
Bulgarian Muslims. 
 
The combination of these factors has a lot of negative consequences 
but those which deserve the greatest deal of attention are marginalization 
and encapsulation of a part of the Muslim community. Because of the above-
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mentioned factors, in some of the Muslims – especially those in whose life 
religion plays an important role –  emerges the feeling that they are “rejected” 
by the majority; they remain related to it mainly because of the common for 
all Bulgarians economical and everyday hardships in the transition period. In 
some of the re-Islamized Bulgarian citizens originated the permanent point of 
view that it is difficult to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim society. Such difficulties 
of integration and full co-existence have already started to create serious 
problems in American and some Western European societies; Bulgaria will 
confront them as a member of the EU too. 
At this stage the intertwining of the aforementioned factors lead to some 
disturbing processes which in a most general manner affect the problems of 
the two important spheres of the public life in Bulgaria, namely Islamic 
religious education and leadership in Muslim community. Although they are 
different in their manifestation, the process of deepening of those problems 
could lead to separations among Muslims; the consequences are difficult to 
foresee as this would aggravate the differences in their religious points of view 
and cultural identity by hindering their adequate integration in the public 
sphere. All of this, despite the native character of the Bulgarian Muslim 
community, to a great extent could lead to convergence between the 
problems of the Bulgarian society and Western society.  
3.6 Islamic Religious Education in Bulgaria 
At the moment in Bulgaria on different educational levels function different 
types of Islamic schools: 
• The Higher Islamic Institute, Sofia: 
The institute which was established in the beginning of the 90’s of the last 
century and has a status of private college affiliated with the Chief Mufti 
Administration in Bulgaria. The state does not allot finance for it, meanwhile 
delegating its financial support to the pro-government Turkish Religious 
Foundation (Diyanet Vakfi). Although it has already been functioning for a 
whole decade, the High Islamic Institute offers an exclusively low level of 
education and suffers from lacks of qualified staff. The insufficient number of 
the habilitated professors is among the chief reasons because of which the 
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diploma of the Institutes graduates is not acknowledges by the Bulgarian state. 
Thus they could find their professional realization only in the Mufti system as 
hojjas and imams or teachers in Islam. This leads to lack of other perspectives 
before the Institute graduates. On this stage the High Islamic Institute is not in 
fact capable of producing well educated qualified staff.  The aggravated 
present condition of the Islamic university education lead to promoting of 
different idea about its future, but nether of then has been accomplished by 
now which effected in young Muslims the feeling that true religious education 
is possible abroad only.  
• High Islamic Spiritual School in Shumen, Rousse and Momchilgrad: 
The subjects taught in them are Islamic sciences, as well as all secular 
disciplines which are taught in Bulgarian state schools. They are coordinated 
with all of the criteria of the Ministry of Education and provide their graduates 
with good perspectives for continuation of their education and social personal 
realization. The biggest problems of these schools is again represented by the 
issue of finance by Diyanet Vakfi, which in the case also controls entirely the 
religious education while the teaching process is often performed in Turkish 
only. This is not an obstacle to the majority of the ethnical Turks, but a 
problem appears when taking into consideration the fact that in recent years 
practically the greatest shares of the students are Pomaks.  This creates in 
the representatives of the Pomaks a sense of inferiority and they share that 
they feel “Turkisized” instead of receiving good religious education. Among 
the reasons for that is the natural propaganda of a “Turkish” vision of Islam 
which insists upon preservation of Ottoman heritage.  All of this, however, 
contradicts the re-Islamization processes among Pomaks who start looking for 
alternatives way to receive a religious education.  In this way, in spite of the 
valid diploma issued by these schools, they stay aside from the significant 
processes that keep on running in the Bulgarian Muslim community. 
• Religious schools of the “Qur’an-Course” type: 
These schools have appeared in the last decade and are of a particular 
interest; that is why they turned into a subject of lively debates in media and 
public c space as a whole. The subjects taught in them are only part of 
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traditional Islamic religious sciences related to the Qur’an and partly related to 
the Prophetic Tradition (what the Prophet Mohammed did or said) and Islamic 
law. These types of schools are spread in some settlements with dominant 
Muslim population.  The school of that type near the village of Sarnitsa in the 
Dospat region has become to enjoy a lamentable reputation though an 
exaggerated one. Although its school curricula has been approved by the 
Grand Mufti Administration, the cultural gap between its graduates and the 
followers of the traditional Islam in Bulgarian territories is that great that the 
school periodically falls in the focus of public attention.  There are also Qur’an 
courses that develop its activities assisted by Turkish support. A typical 
example of such a school is the school in the village of Ustina.  
The Qur’an courses are foreign to Bulgarian educational and cultural 
model and are characterized by the extremely low level of education which is 
granted in them. After the graduation of a certain school, its graduates (whose 
age ranges between 15 and 30) could only become imams or hojjas. They are 
deprived of a secular perspective of a future realization. With the diploma of 
the Qur’an courses they cannot be appointed to a working place in a 
Bulgarian institution or to enroll a Bulgarian higher education institution.  This 
peculiarity could contribute to the marginalization of a part of the future local 
spiritual Muslim elite. It could lead to its encapsulating; having in mind its 
importance for the formation of the growing generations, this is a factor to 
narrow the perspectives before the full integration of the Muslim minority in 
Bulgarian society. Many of the Bulgarian Muslims who received their 
education in the Arab world find their professional realization as teachers and 
educators exactly in the schools of that type.   
As a whole the issue of religious education of the Muslim minority is one of 
the greatest challenges before the Bulgarian society and state. Its importance 
is all the more emphasized also by the influence exerted in our country by 
global and regional processes related international terrorism, ethnical and 
religious conflicts in the Middle East.  The importance of the issue how to 
stimulate predictability of the Muslim elite and the transparency of its activity 
will be outlined more and more clearly. It is not coincidental that influential 
religious and political centers of the Middle East direct their efforts precisely to 
the field of education and religious propaganda.     
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3.7 The foreign Islamic influence in Bulgaria 
Speaking about the origin of the foreign influences that penetrate Bulgaria in 
recent years, they come mainly from Turkey, the Arabic world and Iran. The 
influence of Teheran is too weak because its only social basis could be built 
upon the Alewi Shia community  in North eastern Bulgaria but they 
themselves are too secularized as between them and Iranians exist cultural 
differences that cannot be overcome. Besides that, the Turkish ethnical 
identity of the Kizilbash population constitutes an additional obstacle for the 
serious infiltration of Iranian religious influence among Bulgarian Muslims.  
The influence of Turkey upon the Muslim community in Bulgaria is 
traditional. On the first place, it is so because ethnical Turks represent the 
most numerous ethnical segment among our Muslims. Not less important, 
however, is the fact that – though in an unofficial form – the Bulgarian state 
has always left Turkey exert its influence and even control over the religious 
affairs of the Bulgarian Muslims.  When this was allowed   after the 
democratization, probably it had its grounds in the state policy because of the 
secular character of the Turkish state and its firm control over the religious 
institutions and movements. Today the results of this policy are ambiguous. 
Probably the most important problem in this aspect is related to the fact that 
even if the Turkish control – in this case represented by organizations such as 
the powerful “Diyanet Vakfi” or foundations such as “Ahmed Davudoglu” – is 
relatively well accepted by ethnical Turks, in many other aspects it is not 
adequate as far as Pomaks or Roma Muslims are concerned.   Turkish 
religious influence is particularly painfully accepted by Pomaks, especially in 
the Central Rhodopes region; thus they feel abandoned by the Bulgaria state 
and get the impression that they are artificially pushed towards Turkization.  
The existing religious educational institutions in Bulgaria do not respond to 
the educational needs of the Muslim community in the Central Rhodopes 
region because they are chiefly conformed to the needs of the ethnical Turks. 
Besides the extremely low educational level in them of education in them, in 
many places the educational process is carried out in Turkish which is not 
spoken by the population of the Central Rhodopes region. This made a great 
part of the community to receive its education abroad mainly in the Arab 
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states. Precisely those people who graduated abroad turned into the main 
vehicle of the re-Islamization process in the region. That is why exactly those 
Muslims who have preserved their Bulgarian ethnical identity or those of them 
who define themselves as “Pomaks” are pointed at for being the most 
susceptible ones to the penetration of conservative and fundamental 
influences from Middle Eastern (mainly   Arabic) regimes and movements.  
Among those tendencies the most embarrassing one is the Wahhabism 
dominating over Saudi Arabia – one of most traditionalist and purist 
interpretations of Islam on the global scene (for example, in Saudi Arabia 
where the dominant legal school of the Islamic law is the Hanbali one, in case 
of theft is applied the sanction   of cutting hands off; in case of repeating the 
crime, the penalty is cutting of one leg etc.) 
The penetration of such an influence of conservative and fundamentally 
minded sponsors from the Arab world often utilizes the reluctance of the 
Pomaks to develop their religiosity under the control of Turkish organizations 
and religious authorities.  The ways and the means through which this 
influence tries to impose itself, are charity foundations such as “Tayba” or 
“Irshad”, translations in Bulgarian language of more conservative sources of 
Islamic thought and Islamists among contemporary authors (for example, 
thinkers such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi or Ahmad al-Ghazzali). Being interesting 
and important by itself for the processes that keep on running in contemporary 
Islam, the point of view of these ideologists dethrone in an indirect way the 
dominant “Turkish interpretation” of Islamic faith in Bulgaria, as well as the 
system of rituals and rites. Together with these authors, children literature is 
also being published, as well many popular writings with dubious quality. 
Besides the above-mentioned financing of schools of the Qur’an course type, 
among other forms of penetration of such influence is also sending young 
people to be educated in the Arabic world as the criteria applied to elect 
candidates are not clear; the administration of the Grand Mufti does not have 
full information on the number of young people who have graduated their 
education abroad.    
The religious education of the young people who return to the Central 
Rhodopes mountains (in most of the cases they are appointed by the local 
citizens for imams) in no way complies with the traditions of local Islam, but 
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rather with those ones in the country that they have graduated in. This fact 
often gives rise to conflicts between he local Muslim community and the imam, 
as well as between the Islamic and the Christian communities in the region of 
the Central Rhodopes because a model of mutual recognition, respect and 
non-conflict co-existence was developed; this model, however, has been 
leaning on century long traditions in the basis of which stands local Islam and 
not Islam of the Arab world. 
The type of Islam professed by the re-Islamized Muslims is quite different 
from that one of Muslims, professing their faith by virtue of tradition and who 
have learned its doctrines by oral tradition. The young generation of Pomaks 
is separated from its traditional until now roots under the influence of foreign 
to their experience in the Bulgarian territories interpretations of Islam. In some 
places there are also attempts to substitute the traditional for the Balkans and 
more liberal law school of the Hanafis with the non-typical for our region and 
extremely conservative one of Hanbalism. These tendencies and processes 
lead to a conflict of interests and confrontations of various religious influences 
upon Muslims in Bulgaria, inevitably affecting also their new spiritual elite.       
3.8 Splitting among Religious Leaders of Muslims in Bulgaria 
Among the Muslim community in Bulgaria there are processes of splitting 
which probably will have permanent impact and will reflect upon the 
appearance and future fate of Muslims in our country. In the public space was 
launched the thesis that this is only a matter of scuffles of leaders with the 
only purpose to obtain high offices in the system of the Grand Mufti 
administration and the local Mufti organs. In fact, the reasons are not that 
simple and are related to two types of factors – internal political fights and 
outer religious influences.   
The internal political factors circle around the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms. The Turkish ethnical minority, more of the representatives of which 
accept Islam more through a cultural-ethnographical point of view, as a whole 
think it natural that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – even being a 
secular political party – exerts a “natural” control upon the representatives of 
the Islamic leadership. Roma population is relatively indifferent to that fact. 
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Pomaks, however, and among them mainly Bulgarian Muslims in the Central 
Rhodopes, react to this fact as a violation of their own ethnical and religious 
identity.  
There is one indicative fact, and it is that the election of the most recent 
Grand Mufti – the Pomak Mustafa Alish who undoubtedly is one of the most 
educated new Islamic leaders in Bulgaria – did not calm down vehemence in 
the discussions of this issue regardless of his own personal qualities. Just 
contrary to that, this led to deepening the separation as Bulgarian Muslims 
(particularly those in the central Rhodopes region) are convinced that his 
election is entirely due to contracting a “deal with the Movement for Rights 
and Freedoms”. As a reaction of this, oppositionally minded Muslims have 
already started discussing the idea of establishing an alternative Grand Mufti’s 
administration the establishment of which would have much more serious 
consequences than the permanent parody performances of ex-Grand Mufti 
Nedim Gendjev who occupied the office during the Communist rule. Another 
option discussed by the oppositional religious groups in the establishment of 
an Islamic Union which means the appearance of a new center of authority in 
the Islamic community.  
At this stage the final conclusion of this delicate and complex environment 
around contesting the authority of the Grand Mufti is difficult to foresee, 
although generally speaking, it is more probable that the disintegration 
processes will be aggravated. Taking into consideration the global and 
regional challenges that stand before the Islamic community, this is a serious 
problem which hides potential security risks.  
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
The analysis of the processes related to the public role of Islam in the 
countries of the Western Balkans leads to the following conclusions and 
recommendations for the public policy in the context of Wider Europe 
processes:  
 
• Among Muslims in both the Western Balkans and Bulgaria there are 
clearly distinguishable processes of re-Islamization which have a 
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permanent and irreversible character and will continue to develop with 
different levels of dynamic in the different countries through the years to 
come.  These processes are most clearly outlined among the Slavonic-
speaking Muslim communities like the Bosniaks in the Western Balkans 
and like the Pomaks in the Bulgarian Rhodopes region. 
• In former Yugoslavia the re-Islamization of Muslims will continue with its 
fastest rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by Sandzak (Serbia), 
where the town of Novi Pazar is an important centre of contemporary 
Islamic education and culture, and last come the former Yugoslavian 
territories inhabited by ethnical Albanians, where the region of Tetovo 
(Macedonia) is a main religious centre preceded by Prishtina (Kosovo). 
• In the context of the whole region of the Western Balkans two main 
centers of Islamic education and religious life emerge – Bosnia for the 
Slavonic-speaking Muslim population and Prishtina for ethnic Albanians, 
although for the latter in recent years religion has played a less 
significant role in their personal and public life.  
• Just like Bulgaria, in the Western Balkans there is also a conflict 
between generations on a religious basis.   
• As it is in Bulgaria too, Muslims in former Yugoslavia countries are 
extraordinary separated among themselves in the sphere of their 
religious beliefs and worldview concepts, as well as on the administrative 
and organizational level. These separations among Muslim communities 
and particularly the status of Muslims in Sandzak which still remains 
vague constitute a suitable ground for controversial influences and the 
development of negative centrifugal processes.   
• Religion, including Islam, in the former Yugoslavian states, is strongly 
“ethnicized”, as Islam represents a sign of not only confessional, but also 
of national identity.  
• A crisis of ethnical identity exists among the Slavic-speaking Muslims 
like the Pomak population which is deepened by the political influence 
exerted upon them. Muslims in the central Rhodopes region have the 
most clearly manifested Bulgarian ethnical conscience. That is why they 
obviously distinguish themselves from the Turkish religious influence 
which has been imposed. 
• In the years that follow Bulgarian Christians and Muslims in the 
Rhodopes region should work out a new model of co-existence, 
grounded from one side upon the type of Islam that the re-Islamized 
Muslim community professes, and from another upon the type of 
Orthodox Christianity that the re-Christianized Orthodox community 
professes.  
• The process of re-Islamization among Rhodopes Muslims cannot and 
should not be stopped because this would mean to violate the right of 
this population to profess its religion and live according to its own 
convictions. This quite “natural” and necessary for Muslims process 
could be redirected to take a positive course in the first place through 
means of education. 
• Pomaks still hope that the Bulgarian state will not forsake them and will 
take the measures necessary to prevent regional moods of vehemence 
from bursting out on a national level. Among them was formed the 
opinion that unless the Bulgarian state uses its resources, as well as 
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programs from the EU and the USA to solve their religious problems in 
about ten years the Rhodopes region could need a peacemaking 
process.  
• Because of the lack of its own Bulgarian school in the field of Islamic 
religious education and also taking into consideration the fact that in 
traditional religious schools the educational process is often carried out 
in Turkish, also the interpretation of Islam typical for Turkey is promoted, 
a lot of the Pomaks especially in the Central Rhodopes region, find their 
way to Arab educational centers which leads to importing foreign 
religious and cultural traditions in the Bulgarian territories.   
• Regarding this, the issue of Islamic education in Bulgaria is outlined as 
one of the most important ones not only in the sphere of education and 
science but also in the security field. 
• A major problem of the Islamic religious community in Bulgaria is the 
growing permanent separation among its leaders which is looked upon 
by Muslims as something provoked by the political intervention in 
religious affairs on an ethnical ground. This could lead to establishing a 
numerous centers of influence among Bulgaria Muslims which could 
make them less predictable than if they acknowledged a certain 
centralized religious authority.  
• The lack of unified leadership will weaken the mechanisms to control the 
processes that run in the framework of the Bulgarian Muslim community 
on behalf of the state. The same effect will be also exerted by an entirely 
formal unified leadership which, however, is not legitimate in the eyes of 
large parts of the Bulgarian Muslim population. 
• The separated Muslim community in Bulgaria represents a convenient 
ground for development of diverse influences and start of negative 
centrifugal processes because separation provides a ground for 
controversies not only in the sphere of promoting different schools of 
Islam by people graduated abroad but also among their followers.      
• The Bulgarian state should help Muslims to find solution of the existing 
problems without violating their will to obtain religious independence and 
without tolerating direct political interventions as an instrument to 
influence them.    
• The effect of the Turkish influence permitted and encouraged in the 
religious life of Bulgarian Muslims should be reconsidered in the light of 
the new conditions so that they should not lead to loss of Bulgarian 
identity among Pomaks and to maintaining artificially low level among 
new Muslim spiritual leaders which in the long run could prove to be 
extremely problematic. 
• It is necessary to have an updated national strategy on the issues of 
Muslim religious community and Islam which responds to contemporary 
problems; it should provide people who profess Islam with an opportunity 
to lead a fully-orbed spiritual life without being marginalized and 
detached from Bulgarian culture and society. 
• The new strategies of the EU that corresponds to contemporary 
problems related to Muslim religious communities and Islam on the 
Balkans should enable those who profess it to live a fully-orbited spiritual 
life without being marginalized and separated from the secular type 
societies and culture in South-Eastern Europe.  
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5. General Conclusion 
Conceiving new realities in a constructive way requires that public policy 
retain ideals of social justice and human rights whilst redefining traditional 
secularist strategies. There are needs to be intensive academic and 
programmatic work that addresses intercultural relations from a religious 
perspective, and not only from the point of view of inter-ethnic coexistence, 
which has been the case for the last fifteen years. Muslims in Bulgaria and the 
Balkans as Muslims elsewhere in Europe are experiencing a clearly definable 
though varied process of re-Islamization that seems to be irreversible. There 
is a conflict between the generations among the Muslim communities in the 
Balkans – the younger tend to “impose” the model of “classical” Islam while 
the older prefers the “traditional”, i.e. the inherited from Ottoman times, 
interpretation of the religious doctrine and practice. Re-Islamization often 
seems to be accompanied by a de-culturation which leads to a crisis of the 
national and ethnic identities. Societies and policy makers face the challenge 
to elaborate a new model of co-existence in which the models inherited in the 
Balkans with its indigenous Muslim population can be helpful in some aspects 
also within the EU. Religion should not be completely marginalized in public 
life. 
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